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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate knowledge reasoning within a simple framework called
knowledge structure. We use variable forgetting as a basic operation for one agent to reason
about its own or other agents’ knowledge. In our framework, two notions namely agents’
observable variables and the weakest sufficient condition play important roles in knowledge
reasoning. Given a background knowledge base Γ and a set of observable variables Oi for
each agent i, we show that the notion of agent i knowing a formula ϕ can be defined as a
weakest sufficient condition of ϕ over Oi under Γ. Moreover, we show how to capture the
notion of common knowledge by using a generalized notion of weakest sufficient condition.
Also, we show that public announcement operator can be conveniently dealt with via
our notion of knowledge structure. Further, we explore the computational complexity
of the problem whether an epistemic formula is realized in a knowledge structure. In
the general case, this problem is PSPACE-hard; however, for some interesting subcases,
it can be reduced to co-NP. Finally, we discuss possible applications of our framework
in some interesting domains such as the automated analysis of the well-known muddy
children puzzle and the verification of the revised Needham-Schroeder protocol. We believe
that there are many scenarios where the natural presentation of the available information
about knowledge is under the form of a knowledge structure. What makes it valuable
compared with the corresponding multi-agent S5 Kripke structure is that it can be much
more succinct.
1. Introduction
Epistemic logics, or logics of knowledge are usually recognized as having originated in the
work of Jaakko Hintikka - a philosopher who showed how certain modal logics could be
used to capture intuitions about the nature of knowledge in the early 1960s (Hintikka,
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1962). In the mid of 1980s, Halpern and his colleagues discovered that S5 epistemic logics
could be given a natural interpretation in terms of the states of processes (commonly called
agents) in a distributed system. This model now is known as the interpreted system model
(Fagin, Halpern, Moses, & Vardi, 1995). It was found that this model plays an important
role in the theory of distributed systems and has been applied successfully in reasoning
about communication protocols (Halpern & Zuck, 1992). However, the work on epistemic
logic has mainly focused on theoretical issues such as variants of modal logic, completeness,
computational complexity, and derived notions like distributed knowledge and common
knowledge.
In this paper, we explore knowledge reasoning within a more concrete model of knowl-
edge. Our framework of reasoning about knowledge is simple and powerful enough to
analyze realistic protocols such as some widely used security protocols.
To illustrate the problem investigated in this paper, let us consider the communication
scenario that Alice sends Bob a message and Bob sends Alice an acknowledgement when
receiving the message. We assume Alice and Bob commonly have the following background
knowledge base ΓCS :
Bob recv msg ⇒ Alice send msg
Bob send ack ⇒ Bob recv msg
Alice recv ack ⇒ Bob send ack
whereBob recv msg andBob send ack are observable variables to Bob, whileAlice send msg
and Alice recv ack are observable to Alice.
The problem we are concerned with is how to verify that Alice or Bob knows a statement
ϕ. Intuitively, we should be able to prove that for a statement observable to Alice (Bob),
Alice (Bob) knows the statement if and only if the statement itself holds. As for the
knowledge of non-observable statements, the following should hold:
1. Alice knows Bob recv msg if Alice recv ack holds; on the other hand, if Alice knows
Bob recv msg, then Alice recv ack holds, which means that, in the context of this
example, the only way that Alice gets to know Bob recv msg is that Alice receives
the acknowledgement from Bob.
2. Bob knowsAlice send msg ifBob recv msg holds; moreover, if Bob knowsAlice send msg,
then Bob recv msg holds. The latter indicates that the only way that Bob gets to
know Alice send msg is that Bob receives the message from Alice.
3. Finally, Bob does not know Alice recv ack.
The idea behind the presented knowledge model for those scenarios demonstrated above
is that an agent’s knowledge is just the agent’s observations or logical consequences of the
agent’s observations under the background knowledge base.
One of the key notions introduced in this paper is agents’ observable variables. This
notion shares a similar spirit of those of local variables in the work of van der Hoek and
Wooldridge (2002) and local propositions in the work of Engelhardt, van der Meyden and
Moses (1998) and in the work of Engelhardt, van der Meyden and Su (2003). Informally
speaking, local propositions are those depending only upon an agent’s local information;
and an agent can always determine whether a given local proposition is true. Local variables
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are those primitive propositions that are local. Nevertheless, the notion of local propositions
(Engelhardt et al., 1998, 2003) is a semantics property of the truth assignment function in a
Kripke structure, while the notion of local variables (van der Hoek & Wooldridge, 2002) is a
property of syntactical variables. In this paper, we prefer to use the term “observable vari-
able” in order to avoid any confusion with the term “local variable” used in programming,
where “non-local variables” such as “global variables” may often be observable.
Our knowledge model is also closely related to the notion of weakest sufficient condition,
which was first formalized by Lin (2001). Given a background knowledge base Γ and a set
of observable variables Oi for each agent i, we show that the notion of agent i knowing a
formula ϕ can be defined as the weakest sufficient condition of ϕ over Oi under Γ, which can
be computed via the operation of variable forgetting (Lin & Reiter, 1994) or eliminations
of middle terms (Boole, 1854). Moreover, we generalize the notion of weakest sufficient
condition and capture the notion of common knowledge.
Now we briefly discuss the role of variable forgetting in our knowledge model. Let us
examine the scenario described above again. Consider the question: how can Alice figure
out Bob’s knowledge when she receives the acknowledgement from Bob? Note that Alice’s
knowledge is the conjunction of the background knowledge base ΓCS and her observations
Alice recv ack etc. Moreover, all Alice knows about Bob’s knowledge is the conjunction
of the background knowledge base ΓCS and all she knows about Bob’s observations. Thus,
Alice gets Bob’s knowledge by computing all she knows about Bob’s observations. In our
setting, Alice gets her knowledge on Bob’s observations simply by forgetting Bob’s non-
observable variables in her own knowledge.
There is a recent trend of extending epistemic logics with dynamic operators so that the
evolution of knowledge can be expressed (van Benthem, 2001; van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek,
& Kooi, 2005a). The most basic extension is public announcement logic (PAL), which is
obtained by adding an operator for truthful public announcements (Plaza, 1989; Baltag,
Moss, & Solecki, 1998; van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek, & Kooi, 2005b). We show that public
announcement operator can be conveniently dealt with via our notion of knowledge struc-
ture. This makes the notion of knowledge structure genuinely useful for those applications
like the automated analysis of the well-known muddy children puzzle.
From the discussion above, we can see that our framework of reasoning about knowl-
edge is appropriate in those situations where every agent has a specified set of observable
variables. To further show the significance of our framework, we investigate some of its
interesting applications to the automated analysis of the well-known muddy children puzzle
and the verification of the revised Needham-Schroeder protocol (Lowe, 1996).
We believe that there are many scenarios where the natural presentation of the available
information about knowledge is under the form of a knowledge structure. What makes it
valuable compared with the corresponding multi-agent S5 Kripke structure is that it can
be much more succinct. Of course, the price to pay is that determining whether a formula
holds in a knowledge structure is PSPACE-hard in the general case, while it is in PTIME
when the corresponding S5 Kripke structure is taken as input. However, the achieved
trade-off between time and space can prove computationally valuable. In particular, the
validity problem from a knowledge structure can be addressed for some instances for which
generating the corresponding Kripke structure would be unfeasible. The muddy children
puzzle shows this point clearly: generating the corresponding Kripke structure is impossible
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from a practical point of view, even for the least number of children considered in the
experiments.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we briefly introduce the
concept of forgetting and the notion of weakest sufficient and strongest necessary conditions.
In Section 3, we define our framework of reasoning about knowledge via variable forgetting.
In Section 4, we generalize the notion of weakest sufficient condition and strongest necessary
condition to capture common knowledge within our framework. In Section 5, we show
that public announcement operator can also be conveniently dealt with via our notion of
knowledge structure. Section 6 discusses the computational complexity issue about the
problem of whether an epistemic formula is realized in a knowledge structure. In the
general case, this problem is PSPACE-hard; however, for some interesting subcases, it can
be reduced to co-NP. In Section 7, we consider a case study by applying our framework
to model the well known muddy children puzzle; and further more to security protocol
verification in Section 8. Finally, we discuss some related work and conclude the paper with
some remarks.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we provide some preliminaries about the notions of variable forgetting and
weakest sufficient condition, and epistemic logic.
2.1 Forgetting
Given a set of propositional variables P , we identify a truth assignment over P with a subset
of P . We say a formula ϕ is a formula over P if each propositional variable occurring in ϕ
is in P . For convenience, we define true as an abbreviation for a fixed valid propositional
formula, say p ∨ ¬p, where p is primitive proposition in P . We abbreviate ¬true by false.
We also use |= to denote the usual satisfaction relation between a truth assignment and
a formula. Moreover, for a set of formulas Γ and a formula ϕ, we use Γ |= ϕ to denote that
for every assignment σ, if σ |= α for all α ∈ Γ, then σ |= ϕ.
Given a propositional formula ϕ, and a propositional variable p, we denote by ϕ( ptrue)
the result of replacing every p in ϕ by true. We define ϕ( pfalse) similarly.
The notion of variable forgetting (Lin & Reiter, 1994), or eliminations of middle terms
(Boole, 1854), can be defined as follows:
Definition 1 Let ϕ be a formula over P , and V ⊆ P . The forgetting of V in ϕ , denoted
as ∃V ϕ, is a quantified formula over P , defined inductively as follows:
1. ∃∅ϕ = ϕ;
2. ∃{p}ϕ = ϕ ( ptrue) ∨ ϕ ( pfalse) ;
3. ∃(V ∪ {p})ϕ = ∃V (∃{p}ϕ).
For convenience, we use ∀V ϕ to denote ¬∃V (¬ϕ).
Example 2: Let ϕ = (p ∨ q) ∧ (¬p ∨ r). We have ∃{p}ϕ ≡ (q ∨ r) and ∃{q}ϕ ≡ (¬p ∨ r).
2
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Many characterizations of variable forgetting, together with complexity results, are re-
ported in the work of Lang and Marquis (1998). In particular, the notion of variable
forgetting is closely related to that of formula-variable independence (Lang, Liberatore, &
Marquis, 2003).
Definition 3 Let ϕ be a propositional formula, and V a set of propositional variables. We
say ϕ is independent from V if and only if ϕ is logically equivalent to a formula in which
none of the variables in V appears.
The following proposition was given in the work of Lang, Liberatore and Marquis (2003).
Proposition 4 Let ϕ be a propositional formula, and V a set of propositional variables.
Then ∃V ϕ is the logically strongest consequence of ϕ that is independent from V (up to
logical equivalence).
2.2 Weakest Sufficient Conditions
The formal definitions of weakest sufficient conditions and strongest necessary conditions
were first formalized via the notion of variable forgetting by Lin (2001), which in turn play
an essential role in our approach.
Definition 5 Let V be a set of propositional variables and V ′ ⊆ V . Given a set of formulas
Γ over V as a background knowledge base and a formula α over V .
• A formula ϕ over V ′ is called a sufficient condition of α over V ′ under Γ if Γ |= ϕ⇒ α.
It is called a weakest sufficient condition of α over V ′ under Γ if it is a sufficient
condition of α over V ′ under Γ, and for any sufficient condition ϕ′ of α on V ′ under
Γ, we have Γ |= ϕ′ ⇒ ϕ.
• A formula ϕ over V ′ is called a necessary condition of α over V ′ under Γ if Γ |= α⇒ ϕ.
It is called a strongest necessary condition of α over V ′ under Γ if it is a necessary
condition of α over V ′ under Γ, and for any necessary condition ϕ′ of α over V ′ under
Γ, we have Γ |= ϕ⇒ ϕ′.
The notions given above are closely related to theory of abduction. Given an observation,
there may be more than one abduction conclusion that we can draw. It should be useful
to find the weakest one of such conclusions, i.e., the weakest sufficient condition of the
observation (Lin, 2001). The notions of strongest necessary and weakest sufficient conditions
of a proposition also have many potential applications in other areas such as reasoning about
actions. The following proposition, which is due to Lin (2001), shows how to compute the
two conditions.
Proposition 6 Given a background knowledge base {θ} over V , a formula α over V , and
a subset V ′ of V . Let SNCα and WSCα be a strongest necessary condition and a weakest
sufficient condition of α over V ′ under {θ} respectively. Then
• WSCα is equivalent to ∀(V − V ′)(θ ⇒ α); and
• SNCα is equivalent to ∃(V − V ′)(θ ∧ α).
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2.3 Epistemic Logic and Kripke Structure
We now recall some standard concepts and notations related to the modal logics for multi-
agents’ knowledge.
Given a set V of propositional variables. Let L(V ) be the set of all propositional formulas
on V . The language of epistemic logic, denoted by Ln(V ), is L(V ) augmented with modal
operator Ki for each agent i. Kiφ can be read “agent i knows φ ”. Let LCn (V ) be the
language of Ln(V ) augmented with modal operator C∆ for each set of agents ∆. A formula
C∆α indicates that it is common knowledge among agents in ∆ that α holds. We omit the
argument V and write Ln and LCn , if it is clear from context.
According to the paper by Halpern and Moses (1992), semantics of these formulas can be
given by means of Kripke structure (Kripke, 1963), which formalizes the intuition behind
possible worlds. A Kripke structure is a tuple (W,pi,K1, · · · ,Kn), where W is a set of
worlds, pi associates with each world a truth assignment to the propositional variables, so
that pi(w)(p) ∈ {true, false} for each world w and propositional variable p, and K1, · · · ,Kn
are binary accessibility relations. By convention, WM , KMi and piM are used to refer to the
set W of possible worlds, the Ki relation and the pi function in the Kripke structure M ,
respectively. We omit the superscript M if it is clear from context. Finally, let C∆ be the
transitive closure of
⋃
i∈∆Ki.
A situation is a pair (M,w) consisting of a Kripke structure and a world w in M . By
using situations, we can inductively give semantics to formulas as follows: for primitive
propositions p,
(M,w) |= p iff piM (w)(p) = true.
Conjunctions and negations are dealt with in the standard way. Finally,
(M,w) |= Kiα iff for all w′ ∈W such that wKMi w′, we have that (M,w′) |= α; and
(M,w) |= C∆α iff for all w′ ∈W such that wCM∆ w′, we have that (M,w′) |= α.
We say a formula α is satisfiable in Kripke structure M if (M,w) |= α for some possible
world w in Kripke structure M .
A Kripke structure M is called an S5n Kripke structure if, for every i, KMi is an equiva-
lence relation. A Kripke structure M is called a finite Kripke structure if the set of possible
worlds is finite. According to the work of Halpern and Moses (1992), we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 7 If a formula is satisfiable in an S5n Kripke structure, then so is in a finite S5n
Kripke structure.
3. Knowledge and Weakest Sufficient Conditions
In our framework, a knowledge structure is a simple model of reasoning about knowledge.
The advantage of this model is, as will be shown later, that agents’ knowledge can be
computed via the operation of variable forgetting.
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3.1 Knowledge Structure
Definition 8 A knowledge structure F with n-agents is a (n + 2)-tuple (V,Γ, O1, · · · , On)
where (1) V is a set of propositional variables; (2) Γ is a consistent set of propositional
formulas over V ; and (3) for each agent i, Oi ⊆ V .
The variables in Oi are called agent i’s observable variables. An assignment that satisfies
Γ is called a state of knowledge structure F . Given a state s of F , we define agent i’s local
state at state s as s ∩Oi. Two knowledge structures are said to be equivalent if they have
the same set of propositional variables, the same set of states and, for each agent i, the
same set of agent i’s observable variables.
A pair (F , s) of knowledge structure F and a state s of F is called a scenario.
Given a knowledge structure (V,Γ, O1, · · · , On) and a set V of subsets of V , we use EV
to denote a relation between two assignments s, s′ on V satisfying Γ such that (s, s′) ∈ EV
iff there exists a P ∈ V with s ∩ P = s′ ∩ P . We use E∗V to denote the transitive closure of
EV .
Let V∆ = {Oi | i ∈ ∆}. We then have that (s, s′) ∈ EV∆ iff there exists an i ∈ ∆ with
s ∩Oi = s′ ∩Oi.
A simple instance of knowledge structure is F0 = ({p, q}, {p⇒ q}, {p}, {q}), where p, q
are propositional variables. There are two agents for knowledge structure F0. Variables p
and q are observable to agents 1 and 2, respectively. We have that V{1,2} = {{p}, {q}}; and
for any two subsets s and s′ of {p, q} that satisfy p⇒ q, we have that (s, s′) ∈ E∗V{1,2} .
We now give the semantics of language LCn based on scenarios.
Definition 9 The satisfaction relationship |= between a scenario (F , s) and a formula ϕ is
defined by induction on the structure of ϕ.
1. For each propositional variable p, (F , s) |= p iff s |= p.
2. For any formulas α and β, (F , s) |= α ∧ β iff (F , s) |= α and (F , s) |= β; and
(F , s) |= ¬α iff not (F , s) |= α.
3. (F , s) |= Kiα iff for all s′ of F such that s′ ∩Oi = s ∩Oi, (F , s′) |= α.
4. (F , s) |= C∆α iff (F , s′) |= α for all s′ of F such that (s, s′) ∈ E∗V∆ .
We say that a proposition formula in L(V ) is i-local if it is over Oi. Clearly, agent i
knows an i-local formula ϕ in F iff Γ |= ϕ.
Let F = (V,Γ, O1, · · · , On) be a knowledge structure. We say that a formula α is realized
in knowledge structure F , if for every state s of F , (F , s) |= α. For convenience, by F |= α,
we denote formula α is realized in knowledge structure F .
We conclude this subsection by the following lemma, which will be used in the remains
of this paper.
Lemma 10 Let V be a finite set of variables, F = (V,Γ, O1, · · · , On) be a knowledge struc-
ture, and s be a state of F . Also suppose that ∆ ⊆ {1, · · · , n}, and V∆ = {Oi | i ∈ ∆}.
Then
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1. for any objective formula ψ (i.e., propositional formula over V ), (F , s) |= ψ iff s |= ψ;
2. for any formula γ ∈ Γ, (F , s) |= γ;
3. for any i-local formula β, (F , s) |= Kiβ ⇔ β;
4. for any formula β, if there exists, for each i ∈ ∆, an i-local formula logically equivalent
to β under Γ, then (F , s) |= C∆β ⇔ β;
5. for any formulas α1 and α2, (F , s) |= Ki(α1 ⇒ α2)⇒ (Kiα1 ⇒ Kiα2);
6. for any formulas α1 and α2, (F , s) |= C∆(α1 ⇒ α2)⇒ (C∆α1 ⇒ C∆α2);
7. for any formula α and i ∈ ∆, (F , s) |= C∆α⇒ KiC∆α.
Proof:
1. The first item of this proposition can be proved by induction on the structure of ψ.
When ψ is a primitive proposition, it is done by the first item of Definition 9. When
ψ is of the form of negation or conjunction, the conclusion also follows immediately
by the first item of Definition 9.
2. The second item of this proposition can be proved by the first item and the fact s
satisfies Γ.
3. Given an i-local formula β, it suffices to show (F , s) |= Kiβ iff (F , s) |= β. By the
first item of this proposition, we have that (F , s) |= β iff s |= β. Moreover, as β is
i-local or over Oi, for all assignments s′ with s′ ∩ Oi = s ∩ Oi, we have that s′ |= β
iff s |= β. Therefore, we get the following three “iff”s: (F , s) |= Kiβ iff, for all state
s′ of F with s′ ∩ Oi = s ∩ Oi, we have that (F , s′) |= β iff, for all state s′ of F with
s′ ∩Oi = s ∩Oi, we have that s′ |= β iff s |= β. Thus, (F , s) |= Kiβ iff (F , s) |= β.
4. Suppose that, for each i ∈ ∆, there exists an i-local formula logically equivalent to β
under Γ. We need to show (F , s) |= C∆β ⇔ β. First, because (s, s) ∈ EV∆ ⊆ E∗V∆ , for
all formula α, we have that (F , s) |= C∆α implies (F , s) |= α. Therefore, it suffices to
prove that (F , s) |= β ⇒ C∆β. Assume (F , s) |= β. To prove that (F , s) |= C∆β, we
need to show that for every assignment s′ such that (s, s′) ∈ E∗V∆ , (F , s′) |= β. From
the definition of E∗V∆ , it suffices to show that for every finite sequence of assignments
s0, · · · , sk with s0 = s and (sj , sj+1) ∈ EV∆ (0 ≤ j < k), we have that for every j ≤ k,
(F , sj) |= β. We show this by induction on j. When j = 0, the result is clearly true.
Assume (F , sj) |= β. Now we prove (F , sj+1) |= β. Because (sj , sj+1) ∈ EV∆ , there is
an i ∈ ∆ such that Oi ∩ sj = Oi ∩ sj+1. On the other hand, we have that sj |= β iff
sj+1 |= β because β is equivalent under Γ to an i-local formula. Hence, (F , sj+1) |= β
as desired.
5. It suffice to show that if (F , s) |= Ki(α1 ⇒ α2) and (F , s) |= Kiα1, then (F , s) |=
Kiα2. Assume that (F , s) |= Ki(α1 ⇒ α2) and (F , s) |= Kiα1, by item 3 of Defini-
tion 9 we get that, for all s′ of F with s′ ∩Oi = s ∩Oi, we have (F , s′) |= (α1 ⇒ α2)
and (F , s′) |= α1. However, by item 2 of Definition 9, we get (F , s′) |= α2 from
(F , s′) |= (α1 ⇒ α2) and (F , s′) |= α1. Therefore, we get that, for all s′ of F with
s′ ∩Oi = s ∩Oi, we have (F , s′) |= α2. It follows immediately that (F , s) |= Kiα2.
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6. This item can be shown in the same way as in the proof of item 5.
7. It suffices to prove that for those state s′′ such that there is a state s′ with s ∩ Oi =
s′ ∩Oi and s′E∗V∆s′′, we can get sE∗V∆s′′, which follows immediately from the fact thatE∗V∆ is the transitive closure of EV∆ . 2
3.2 Relationship with S5 Kripke Structure
Given a knowledge structure F = (V,Γ, O1, · · · , On), let M(F) be Kripke structure
(W,pi,K1, · · · ,Kn), where
1. W is the set of all states of F ;
2. for each w ∈W , the assignment pi(w) is the same as w; and
3. for each agent i and assignments w,w′ ∈W , we have that wKiw′ iff w∩Oi = w′ ∩Oi.
The following proposition indicates that a knowledge structure can be viewed as a spe-
cific Kripke structure.
Proposition 11 Given a knowledge structure F , a state s of F , and a formula α in LCn (V ),
we have that (F , s) |= α iff (M(F), s) |= α.
Proof: Immediately by the definition of the satisfaction relationship between a scenario
and a formula and that between a situation and a formula. 2
From Proposition 11, we conclude that if a formula in LCn is satisfiable in some knowledge
structure, then the formula is also satisfiable in some Kripke structure. From the following
proposition and Lemma 7, we can get that if a formula in LCn is satisfiable in some Kripke
structure, then the formula is also satisfiable in some knowledge structure.
Proposition 12 For a finite S5n Kripke structure M with the propositional variable set V
and possible world w in M , there exists a knowledge structure FM and a state sw of F such
that, for every formula α ∈ LCn (V ), we have that (FM , sw) |= α iff (M,w) |= α.
Proof: LetM = (W,pi,R1, · · · , Rn), whereW is a finite set and R1, · · · , Rn are equivalence
relations. Let O1, · · · , On be sets of new propositional variables such that
1. O1, · · · , On are finite and pairwise disjoint; and
2. for each i (0 < i ≤ n), the number of all subsets of Oi is not less than that of all
equivalence classes of Ri.
By the latter condition, there is, for each i, a function gi: W 7→ 2Oi such that for all
w1, w2 ∈ W , gi(w1) and gi(w2) are the same subset of Oi iff w1 and w2 are in the same
equivalence class of Ri.
Let V ′ = V ∪⋃0<i≤nOi. We define a function g :W 7→ 2V ′ as follows. For each possible
world w in W ,
g(w) = {v ∈ V | pi(w)(v) = true} ∪
⋃
0<i≤n
gi(w).
The following two claims hold:
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C1 For all w1, w2 ∈ W , and i (0 < i ≤ n), we have that g(w1) ∩ Oi = g(w2) ∩ Oi iff
w1Riw2.
C2 For all w ∈W and v ∈ V , we have that v ∈ g(w) iff pi(w)(v) = true.
Let
ΓM = {α | α is over V ′, and g(w) |= α for all w ∈W}.
We then get the knowledge structure
FM = (V ′,ΓM , O1, · · · , On).
We now show the following claim:
C3 For every s ⊆ V ′, s is a state of FM iff s = g(w) for some w ∈W.
The “if” part of claim C3 is easy to prove. If s = g(w′) for some w′ ∈ W , then by the
definition of ΓM , we have that g(w′) |= ΓM and hence g(w′) is a state of FM . To show
the “only if” part, assume that for every w ∈ W , s 6= g(w). Then, for every w ∈ W ,
there exists αw over V ′ such that s |= αw but g(w) |= ¬αw. Therefore, s |= ∧w∈W αw.
Moreover, we have that, for every w′ ∈ W , g(w′) |= ∨w∈W ¬αw, and hence ∨w∈W ¬αw ∈
ΓM . Consequently, we have that s 6|= ΓM and hence s is not a state of FM .
To complete the proof, it suffices to show, for every α ∈ LCn (V ), that (FM , g(w)) |= α
iff (M,w) |= α. With conditions C1, C2 and C3, we can do so by induction on α. For the
base case, we assume α is a propositional variable, say p. Then, by condition C2, we have
that (FM , g(w)) |= p iff p ∈ g(w) iff pi(w)(p) = true iff (M,w) |= p.
Suppose that α is not a propositional variable and the claim holds for every subformula
of α. There are three cases:
1. α is of form ¬β or β ∧ γ. This case can be dealt with by the definitions of satisfaction
relations directly.
2. α is of form Kiβ. In this case, we have (FM , g(w)) |= Kiβ iff (FM , s) |= β for all states
s of FM with g(w) ∩Oi = s ∩Oi. By condition C3, we have that (FM , g(w)) |= Kiβ
iff (FM , g(w′)) |= β for all w′ ∈ W with g(w) ∩ Oi = g(w′) ∩ Oi. By condition C1,
we then have (FM , g(w)) |= Kiβ iff (FM , g(w′)) |= β for all w′ ∈ W with wRiw′.
Therefore, by the induction assumption, we have (FM , g(w)) |= Kiβ iff (M,w′) |= β
for all w′ ∈W with wRiw′. The right part is just (M,w) |= Kiβ.
3. α is of form C∆β. Recall that, for arbitrary two states s and s′ of FM , (s, s′) ∈ EV∆
iff there exists an i ∈ ∆ with s ∩Oi = s′ ∩Oi. By condition C1, for all w1, w2 ∈W ,
(g(w1), g(w2)) ∈ EV∆ iff (w1, w2) ∈
⋃
i∈∆
Ri.
As E∗V∆ is the transitive closure of EV∆ , and CM∆ is that of
⋃
i∈∆Ri, by condition C3
we get that
(g(w1), g(w2)) ∈ E∗V∆ iff (w1, w2) ∈ CM∆
for all w1, w2 ∈W .
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We want to show that (FM , g(w)) |= C∆β iff (M,w) |= C∆β. On one hand, (FM , g(w)) |=
C∆β iff for all states s of FM with (g(w), s) ∈ E∗V∆ , (FM , s) |= β. By condition C3,
we have that (FM , g(w)) |= C∆β iff for all w′ ∈ W with (g(w), g(w′)) ∈ E∗V∆ . On
the other hand, (M,w) |= C∆β iff for all w′ ∈ W with (w,w′) ∈ CM∆ . Therefore, we
conclude that (FM , g(w)) |= C∆β iff (M,w) |= C∆β by the above discussion. 2
Propositions 11 and 12 show that the satisfiability issue for a formula in the language
of multi-agent S5 with the common knowledge modality is the same whatever satisfiability
is meant w.r.t. a standard Kripke structure or w.r.t. a knowledge structure.
3.3 Knowledge as Weakest Sufficient Conditions
The following theorem establishes a bridge between the notion of knowledge and the notion
of weakest sufficient and strongest necessary conditions.
Theorem 13 Let V be a finite set of variables, F = (V,Γ, O1, · · · , On) a knowledge struc-
ture, α a propositional formula in L(V ), and for an agent i, WSCαi and SNCαi a weakest
sufficient condition and a strongest necessary condition of α over Oi under Γ respectively.
Then, for each state s of F ,
(F , s) |= Kiα⇔WSCαi
and
(F , s) |= ¬Ki¬α⇔ SNCαi .
Proof: We only show (F , s) |= Kiα⇔ WSCαi , while the other part comes in a straight-
forward way by duality between WSCs and SNCs. Because WSCαi is a sufficient condition
of α under Γ, we have Γ |= WSCαi ⇒ α. Let θ be the conjunction of all formulas in
Γ, then we have |= θ ⇒ (WSCαi ⇒ α), which leads to (F , s) |= KiWSCαi ⇒ Kiα (by
item 5 of Lemma 10.) Because WSCαi is i-local, by Lemma 10 (item 3) again, we have
(F , s) |=WSCαi ⇒ KiWSCαi . Hence, (F , s) |=WSCαi ⇒ Kiα.
To show the other direction (F , s) |= Kiα ⇒ WSCαi , we consider the formula ∀(V −
Oi)(θ ⇒ α), where θ is the same as above. By Proposition 6, we have Γ |= ∀(V −Oi)(θ ⇒
α)⇒WSCαi . On the other hand, we know that (F , s) |= Kiα⇒ ∀(V −Oi)(θ ⇒ α) by the
definition of Kiα. This proves (F , s) |= Kiα⇒WSCαi . 2
The following corollary characterizes the subjective formulas Kiα (where α is objective)
which are satisfied in a given knowledge structure.
Corollary 14 Let V be a finite set of variables, F = (V, {θ}, O1, · · · , On) a knowledge
structure with n agents, and α a formula over V . Then, for every state s of F ,
(F , s) |= Kiα⇔ ∀(V −Oi)(θ ⇒ α).
Proof: Immediately by Theorem 13 and Proposition 6. 2
Example 15 : Now we consider the communication scenario between Alice and Bob
addressed in section 1 once again. To show how our system can deal with the knowledge
reasoning issue in this scenario, we define a knowledge structure F as follows:
F = (V, {θ}, OA, OB),
687
Su, Sattar, Lv, & Zhang
where
• OA = {Alice send msg,Alice recv ack},
• OB = {Bob recv msg,Bob send ack},
• V = OA ∪OB, and
• θ is the conjunction of the following three formulas:
Bob recv msg ⇒ Alice send msg,
Bob send ack ⇒ Bob recv msg,
Alice recv ack ⇒ Bob send ack,
Now given a state of F
s =

Alice send msg,
Alice recv ack,
Bob recv msg,
Bob send ack
 ,
we would like to know whether Alice knows that Bob received the message. Consider the
formula
∀
{
Bob recv msg,
Bob send ack
}
(θ ⇒ Bob recv msg).
From Definition 1, the above formula is simplified as Alice recv ack, which, obviously, is
satisfied in the scenario (F , s), i. e. ,
(F , s) |= Alice recv ack.
Then from Corollary 14, we have
(F , s) |= KABob recv msg.
From item 3 of lemma 10, it follows that
(F , s) |= KAAlice send msg
and
(F , s) |= KAAlice recv ack,
which indicates that Alice knows that she sent the message and she knows that she received
acknowledgement from Bob. 2
Given a set of states S of a knowledge structure F and a formula α, by (F , S) |= α, we
mean that for each s ∈ S, (F , s) |= α. The following proposition presents an alternative
way to compute an agent’s knowledge.
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Proposition 16 Let V be a finite set of variables, F = (V,Γ, O1, · · · , On) a knowledge
structure with n agents, ψ a formula over V , and α a formula in LCn . Suppose that SNCψi
is a strongest necessary condition of ψ over Oi under Γ, Sψ denotes the set of those states s
of F such that (F , s) |= ψ, and S
SNCψi
denotes the set of those states s such that (F , s) |=
SNCψi . Then, for each agent i, we have that
(F , Sψ) |= Kiα iff (F , SSNCψi ) |= α.
Proof: Let S1 be the set of all states s satisfying (F , s) |= ∃(V − Oi)(θ ∧ ψ). Because
Γ |= SNCψi ⇔ ∃(V −Oi)(θ∧ψ), we have S1 = SSNCψi . Also it is easy to see that for state s
of F , s ∈ S1 iff there is a state s′ of F such that s′ |= ψ and s∩Oi = s′ ∩Oi. Therefore we
have (F , Sψ) |= Kiα iff S1 ⊆ {s | (F , s) |= α}. This leads to (F , Sψ) |= Kiα iff (F , S1) |= α
iff (F , S
SNCψi
) |= α. 2
The intuitive meaning behind Proposition 16 is that if all we know about the current
state is ψ, then all we know about agent i’s knowledge (or agent i’s observations) is the
strongest necessary condition of ψ over Oi.
The following proposition provides a method to determined whether a formula with the
nested depth of knowledge operators (like Ki1 · · ·Kikα, where α is a propositional formula)
is always true in those states, where a given proposition formula ψ is true.
Proposition 17 Let V be a finite set of variables, F = (V, {θ}, O1, · · · , On) a knowledge
structure with n agents, α and ψ two formulas over V , and Sψ denotes the set of states s
of F such that (F , s) |= ψ. Then, for each group of agents i1, · · · , ik, we have (F , Sψ) |=
Ki1 · · ·Kikα holds iff
|= θ ∧ ψk ⇒ α
where ψk is defined inductively as follows:
ψ1 = ∃(V −Oi1)(θ ∧ ψ);
and for each j < k,
ψj+1 = ∃(V −Oij+1)(θ ∧ ψj).
Proof: We show this proposition by induction on the nested depth of knowledge opera-
tions. The base case is implied directly by Proposition 16. Assume that the claim holds for
those cases with nested depth k, we want to show it also holds when the nested depth is
k + 1, i. e. ,
(F , Sψ) |= Ki1 · · ·Kik+1α iff |= θ ∧ ψk+1 ⇒ α.
By Proposition 16, we have
(F , Sψ) |= Ki1 · · ·Kik+1α iff (F , Sψ1) |= Ki2 · · ·Kik+1α.
By the inductive assumption, we have that
(F , Sψ1) |= Ki2 · · ·Kik+1α iff |= θ ∧ ψk+1 ⇒ α.
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Combining two assertions above, we get
(F , Sψ) |= Ki1 · · ·Kik+1α iff |= θ ∧ ψk+1 ⇒ α.
2
When we consider the case where the nested depth of knowledge operators is no more
than 2, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 18 Let V,F , α, ψ and Sψ be as in Proposition 17. Then, for each agent i and
each agent j, we have
1. (F , Sψ) |= Kiα holds iff
|= (θ ∧ ∃(V −Oi)(θ ∧ ψ))⇒ α;
2. (F , Sψ) |= KjKiα holds iff
|= (θ ∧ ∃(V −Oi)(θ ∧ ∃(V −Oj)(θ ∧ ψ)))⇒ α.
Proof: Immediately from Proposition 17. 2
As will be illustrated in our analysis of security protocols (i.e. Section 6), the part 2 of
Corollary 18 is useful for verifying protocol specifications with nested knowledge operators.
Given a background knowledge base θ, when we face the task of testing whetherKjKiα holds
in those states satisfying ψ, by part 2 of Corollary 18, we can first get φ1 = ∃(V −Oj)(θ∧ψ),
which is a strongest necessary condition of ψ over Oj . This is all we know about what agent
j observes from ψ. Then we compute φ2 = ∃(V −Oi)(θ∧φ1), i. e. , the strongest necessary
condition of φ1 over Oi which is, from the viewpoint of agent j, about what agent i observes.
In this way, the task of checking KjKiα is reduced to a task of checking θ ∧ φ2 ⇒ α.
The following corollary gives two methods to check the truth of Kiα (where α is a
propositional formula) in all those states where a given formula ψ is true. One is via the
strongest necessary condition of ψ and the other is via the weakest sufficient condition of
α.
Corollary 19 Let V be a finite set of propositional variables and F = (V, {θ}, O1, · · · , On)
a knowledge structure with n agents, α and ψ two formulas over V . Suppose that Sψ denotes
the set of all states s of F such that (F , s) |= ψ, and SNCψi and WSCαi are a strongest
necessary condition of ψ over Oi and a weakest sufficient condition of α over Oi under {θ}
respectively. Then
1. (F , Sψ) |= Kiα iff |= (θ ∧ ψ)⇒WSCαi ; and
2. (F , Sψ) |= Kiα iff |= (θ ∧ SNCψi )⇒ α.
Proof: The first part of the corollary follows from Theorem 13 and Lemma 10, while the
second part follows immediately by Proposition 16. 2
In our analysis of security protocols, we observe that very often, it seems more efficient
to check an agent’s knowledge via the second part of Corollary 19 rather than via the first
part. But this may not be always true for some other applications (e.g. see the example of
the muddy children puzzle in the next section).
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4. Common Knowledge
Common knowledge is a special kind of knowledge for a group of agents, which plays an
important role in reasoning about knowledge (Fagin et al., 1995). A group of agents ∆
commonly know ϕ when all the agents in ∆ know ϕ, they all know that they know ϕ, they
all know that they all know that they know ϕ, and so on ad infinitum. We recall that
common knowledge can be characterized in terms of Kripke structures. Given a Kripke
structure M = (W,pi,K1, · · · ,Kn), a group ∆ of agents commonly know ϕ ( or in modal
logic language, C∆ϕ is true ) in a world w iff ϕ is true in all worlds w′ such that (w,w′) ∈ C∆,
where C∆ denotes the transitive closure of ⋃i∈∆Ki.
In this section, we generalize the concept of weakest sufficient and strongest necessary
conditions so that they can be used to compute common knowledge.
4.1 Generalized Weakest Sufficient and Strongest Necessary Conditions
The following gives a generalized notion of weakest sufficient conditions and strongest nec-
essary conditions.
Definition 20 Given a set of formulas Γ over V as a background knowledge base. Let α
be a formula over V , and V a nonempty set of subsets of V .
• A formula ϕ is called V-definable under Γ (or simply called V-definable if there is no
confusion in the context), if for each P ∈ V, there is a formula ψP over P such that
Γ |= ϕ⇔ ψP .
• A formula ϕ is called a V-sufficient condition of α under Γ if it is V-definable and
Γ |= ϕ ⇒ α. It is called a weakest V-sufficient condition of α under Γ if it is a
V-sufficient condition of α under Γ, and for any other V-sufficient condition ϕ′ of α
under Γ, we have Γ |= ϕ′ ⇒ ϕ.
• Similarly, formula ϕ is called a V-necessary condition of α under Γ if it is V-definable
and Γ |= α ⇒ ϕ. It is called a strongest V-necessary condition of α under Γ if it is a
V-necessary condition of α under Γ, and for any other V-necessary condition ϕ′ of α
under Γ, we have Γ |= ϕ⇒ ϕ′.
We notice that the notion of V-definability introduced here is a simple elaboration of the
notion of V-definability as given in the work of Lang and Marquis (1998): φ is V-definable
under Γ iff φ is V -definable under Γ for each V ∈ V. Moreover, it is easy to see that the
formulas implied by Γ or inconsistent with it are exactly the formulas ∅-definable under Γ,
and that definability exhibits a monotonicity property: if φ is V -definable under Γ, then φ
is V ′-definable under Γ for each superset V ′ of V (Lang & Marquis, 1998). Observe also
that φ is V -definable under Γ iff ¬φ is V -definable under Γ, and this extends trivially to
V-definability.
The following lemma says that the notions of weakest V-sufficient conditions and strongest
V-necessary ones are dual to each other.
Lemma 21 Given a set of formulas Γ over V as a background knowledge base, and V a
set of subsets of V . Let ϕ and α be formulas over V . Then, we have that ϕ is a weakest
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V-sufficient condition of α under Γ iff ¬ϕ is a strongest V-necessary condition of ¬α under
Γ.
Proof: Straightforward by the duality between WSCs and SNCs. 2
To give some intuition and motivation of the above definition, let us consider the fol-
lowing example.
Example 22: Imagine that there are two babies, say Marry and Peter, playing with a
dog. Suppose the propositions “The dog is moderately satisfied” (denoted by m, for short)
and “The dog is full”(f) are understandable to Marry, and the propositions “The dog is
hungry” (h) and “The dog is unhappy”(u) are understandable to Peter.
Let Γ = {h⇒ u,¬(m∧ f), (m∨ f)⇔ ¬h}, V1 = {m, f}, V2 = {h, u}, and V = {V1, V2}.
We will show that
1. h is V-definable under Γ;
2. h is a weakest V-sufficient condition of u under Γ; and
3. ¬h is a strongest V-necessary condition of ¬u under Γ.
The first claim is easy to check by the definition. The last two claims follow immediately if
we can prove that all the V-definable propositions under Γ are false, true, h and ¬h (up
to logical equivalence under Γ). There are 8 propositions over V1 up to logical equivalence.
The 8 propositions are: true, false,m,¬m, f,¬f,m ∨ f,¬m ∧ ¬f . Similarly, there are 8
propositions over V2 up to logical equivalence under Γ, i.e., true, false, h,¬h, u,¬u, h ∨
¬u,¬h ∧ u. However, we can find, between the two classes of propositions, only 4 pairs of
equivalence relations under Γ, i.e., Γ |= true ⇔ true, Γ |= false ⇔ false, Γ |= (m ∨ f) ⇔
¬h, Γ |= (¬m ∧ ¬f) ⇔ h. Therefore, all the V-definable propositions under Γ are false,
true, h and ¬h (up to logical equivalence under Γ). 2
Example 23: Now we recall the background knowledge ΓCS about the communication
scenario between Alice and Bob in the introduction section. ΓCS is the set of the following
three formulas:
Bob recv msg ⇒ Alice send msg
Bob send ack ⇒ Bob recv msg
Alice recv ack ⇒ Bob send ack
Let
OA = {Alice send msg,Alice recv ack},
OB = {Bob recv msg,Bob send ack},
VAB = {OA, OB}.
Clearly, if a formula ϕ is logically implied by ΓCS or inconsistent with ΓCS , then ϕ is
VAB-definable under ΓCS . Moreover, as in Example 22, we are able to check that there
are no VAB-definable formulas other than those implied by ΓCS or inconsistent with ΓCS .
Therefore, given a formula α, a weakest VAB-sufficient condition of α under ΓCS is implied
by ΓCS if ΓCS |= α, or inconsistent with ΓCS . 2
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Let Γ be a set of formulas, V a set of propositional variables, and V a set of subsets
of V . The following proposition gives the existence of weakest V-sufficient and strongest
V-necessary conditions. For a given formula α over V , a weakest V-sufficient condition φ1 of
α and a strongest V-necessary condition φ2 of α can be obtained in the proposition. Indeed,
the set of assignments satisfying φ1 and that of assignments satisfying φ2 can be given in
terms of relation EV .
Proposition 24 Given a finite set V of propositional variables, a set Γ of formulas over V
as a background knowledge base, a formula α over V , and a set V of subsets of V . Denote by
SαWSC the set of assignments s over V such that s |= Γ, and for all assignments s′ satisfying
Γ with (s, s′) ∈ E∗V , s′ |= α. Also denote by SαSNC the set of assignments s over V such that
s |= Γ, and there exists an s′ such that s′ |= Γ, s′ |= α and (s, s′) ∈ E∗V . Then, the following
two points hold.
• If a formula is satisfied exactly by those assignments in SαWSC , then the formula is a
weakest V-sufficient condition of α under Γ; and
• If a formula is satisfied exactly by those assignments in SαSNC , then the formula is a
strongest V-necessary condition of α under Γ.
Proof: We first prove the former point, and then show the other by Lemma 21. Let φ1
be a propositional formula over V such that, for all assignments s, s |= φ1 iff s ∈ SαWSC .
Then, for every assignment s ∈ SαWSC , we have s |= α because (s, s) ∈ E∗V . Thus, φ1 |= α.
We remark that for arbitrarily given formula ϕ over V and assignment s over V , s |=
∀(V − P )ϕ iff for all assignments s′ over V such that s ∩ P = s′ ∩ P , we have s′ |= ϕ.
To prove that φ1 is V-definable, we show that, for each P ∈ V, φ1 |= ∀(V −P )φ1, which
implies that φ1 is equivalent to the formula ∀(V −P )φ1 over P . To prove φ1 |= ∀(V −P )φ1,
in a semantical way, it suffices to show that, for every assignment s ∈ SαWSC and s′ |= Γ, if
s∩P = s′ ∩P , then s′ ∈ SαWSC . Let s and s′ be given as above and suppose s∩P = s′ ∩P .
Then, (s, s′) ∈ EV . Given an assignment t such that t |= Γ, if (s′, t) ∈ E∗V , then (s, t) ∈ E∗V
by (s, s′) ∈ EV . Thus, s′ ∈ SαWSC . This proves that φ1 is V-definable.
Now we show that φ1 is a weakest V-sufficient condition under Γ. Suppose φ is a V-
definable and sufficient condition of α under Γ, we want to prove that Γ |= φ ⇒ φ1. The
semantical argument of such a proof is as follows. Let s be an assignment with s |= Γ
and φ, we must show that s ∈ SαWSC , i.e., for every assignment s′ with s′ |= Γ such that
(s, s′) ∈ E∗V , s′ |= α. Because Γ |= φ⇒ α, it suffices to show that s′ |= φ. By the condition
(s, s′) ∈ E∗V , there is a finite sequence of assignments s0, · · · , sk such that sj |= Γ with s0 = s
and sk = s′, and for every j < k, (sj , sj+1) ∈ EV . By the V-definability of φ, we know that
for every j < k, sj |= φ implies sj+1 |= φ. Thus, we have s′ |= φ by induction.
Now we prove the second point of this proposition by Lemma 21. Let φ2 be a proposi-
tional formula over V such that, for all assignments s, s |= φ2 iff s ∈ SαSNC . Let θ be the
conjunction of formulas in Γ. Then, s |= ¬φ2 ∧ θ iff for all assignments s′ with s′ |= Γ such
that sE∗Vs′, we have s′ |= ¬ϕ. Thus, by the first point of this proposition, we have that
¬φ2 ∧ θ is a weakest V-sufficient condition of ¬α. Thus, φ2 ∨¬θ and hence φ2 is a strongest
V-necessary condition of α according to Lemma 21. 2
The above proposition can be thought of as a semantical characterization of weakest
V-sufficient and strongest V-necessary conditions.
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4.2 Characterizations with Least and Greatest Fixed Points
We investigate the computation of the weakest V-sufficient and strongest V-necessary con-
ditions by using the notions of a least and a greatest fixed points of an operator, which is
introduced as follows. Let V be a set of propositional variables, and Λ be an operator (or a
mapping) from the set of propositional formulas over V to the set of propositional formulas
over V . We say a ψ is a fixed point of Λ, if |= Λ(ψ) ⇔ ψ. We say a ψ0 is a greatest fixed
point of Λ, if ψ0 is a fixed point of Λ and for every fixed point ψ of Λ, we have |= ψ ⇒ ψ0.
Clearly, any two greatest fixed points are logically equivalent to each other. Thus, we denote
a greatest fixed point of Λ by gfpZΛ(Z). Similarly, we say a ψ0 is a least fixed point of Λ,
if ψ0 is a fixed point of Λ and for every fixed point ψ of Λ, we have |= ψ0 ⇒ ψ. We denote
a least fixed point of Λ by lfpZΛ(Z). We say Λ is monotonic, if for every two formulas ψ1
and ψ2 such that |= ψ1 ⇒ ψ2, we have |= Λ(ψ1)⇒ Λ(ψ2). For a finite set V of propositional
variables if Λ is monotonic, then there exists a least fixed point and a greatest fixed point
(Tarski, 1955).
Theorem 25 Let V be a finite set of variables, F = (V, {θ}, O1, · · · , On) a knowledge
structure, α a formula over V , ∆ ⊆ {1, · · · , n}, V∆ = {Oi | i ∈ ∆}. Assume that Λ1 and
Λ2 are two operators such that
Λ1(Z) =
∧
i∈∆
∀(x−Oi)(θ ⇒ Z)
and
Λ2(Z) =
∨
i∈∆
∃(x−Oi)(θ ∧ Z).
Then,
• a weakest V∆-sufficient condition of α under {θ} is equivalent to gfp Z(α ∧ Λ1(Z));
and
• a strongest V∆-necessary condition of α under {θ} is equivalent to lfp Z(α ∨Λ2(Z)).
Proof: Let WSCα∆ be a weakest V∆-sufficient condition of α under {θ}. Note that the
operator (α ∧ Λ1(Z)) is monotonic and thus there exists a greatest fixed point of it. Let
ψ1= gfp Z(α ∧ Λ1(Z)). To prove the first point of this theorem, we must show that
θ |=WSCα∆ ⇔ ψ1.
We first show that θ |=WSCα∆ ⇒ ψ1. For this purpose, we only need to prove
1. θ |=WSCα∆ ⇒ (α ∧ Λ1(true)); and
2. for all formulas ϕ on V , if θ |=WSCα∆ ⇒ ϕ, then θ |=WSCα∆ ⇒ (α ∧ Λ1(ϕ)).
The first point is trivially true because Λ1(true) is equivalent to true and WSCα∆ is a
sufficient condition of α under {θ}. To show the second point, suppose θ |= WSCα∆ ⇒ ϕ.
For i ∈ ∆, let αi be the formula over Oi such that θ |= WSCα∆ ⇔ αi. Then, θ |= αi ⇒ ϕ.
It follows that |= αi ⇒ (θ ⇒ ϕ) and hence |= αi ⇒ ∀(V − Oi)(θ ⇒ ϕ) because αi does
not depend on the variables in (V − Oi). So, we have that, for all i ∈ ∆, θ |= WSCα∆ ⇒
∀(V −Oi)(θ ⇒ ϕ). The conclusion of the second point follows immediately.
We now show that θ |= ψ1 ⇒ WSCα∆, or θ |= (θ ⇒ ψ1) ⇒ WSCα∆. It suffices to show
that θ ⇒ ψ1 is V∆-sufficient condition of α under {θ}, that is,
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1. θ ⇒ ψ1 is V∆-definable; and
2. θ |= (θ ⇒ ψ1)⇒ α.
By the fact that ψ1 is a fixed point of the operator (α ∧ Λ1(Z)), we have that
|= ψ1 ⇒ (α ∧
∧
i∈∆
∀(x−Oi)(θ ⇒ ψ1)).
It follows that |= ψ1 ⇒ α, and hence θ |= (θ ⇒ ψ1) ⇒ α. To show the other point, for
i ∈ ∆, we need to prove that θ ⇒ ψ1 is equivalent to a formula over Oi. By the above, we
have that ψ1 ⇒ ∀(V − Oi)(θ ⇒ ψ1). It follows that θ |= (θ ⇒ ψ1) ⇒ ∀(V − Oi)(θ ⇒ ψ1),
and hence
θ |= (θ ⇒ ψ1)⇔ ∀(V −Oi)(θ ⇒ ψ1)
because |= ∀(V − Oi)(θ ⇒ ψ1) ⇒ (θ ⇒ ψ1) holds trivially. Thus (θ ⇒ ψ1) is equivalent
under θ to ∀(V − Oi)(θ ⇒ ψ1), which is over Oi. This completes the first point of the
conclusion of the theorem.
We now show the second point of this theorem by using the first point and Lemma 21.
Let SNCα∆ be a strongest V∆-necessary condition of α under {θ}. By Lemma 21,
¬SNCα∆ is a weakest V∆-sufficient condition of ¬α under {θ}. Thus, by the first point
of this theorem, ¬SNCα∆ is equivalent to gfp Z(¬α ∧ Λ1(Z)) under θ. Hence, SNCα∆ is
equivalent to ¬gfp Z(¬α ∧ Λ1(Z)) under θ. However, ¬gfp Z(¬α ∧ Λ1(Z)) is logically
equivalent to lfp Z(¬(¬α∧Λ1(¬Z))), which is in turn equivalent to lfp Z(α∨Λ2(Z)). This
completes the second point of the theorem. 2
4.3 Common Knowledge as Weakest V-sufficient Conditions
Given a set ∆ of agents and a family V∆ of observable variable sets of these agents, we
investigate the relationship between common knowledge and the weakest V∆-sufficient and
strongest V∆-necessary conditions.
Theorem 26 Let V be a finite set of variables, F = (V,Γ, O1, · · · , On) a knowledge struc-
ture, ∆ ⊆ {1, · · · , n}, V∆ = {Oi | i ∈ ∆}, α a formula over V , and WSCα∆ and SNCα∆
a weakest V∆-sufficient condition and a strongest V∆-necessary condition of α under Γ
respectively. Then, for every state s of F ,
(F , s) |= C∆α⇔WSCα∆
and
(F , s) |= ¬C∆¬α⇔ SNCα∆.
Proof: We only show the first part of this theorem, i.e., (F , s) |= C∆α ⇔ WSCα∆, by
which and Lemma 21 we can get the other part immediately. Because WSCα∆ is a sufficient
condition of α, we have that Γ |= WSCα∆ ⇒ α. Let θ be the conjunction of all formulas
in Γ, we have that |= θ ⇒ (WSCα∆ ⇒ α), which leads to (F , s) |= C∆WSCα∆ ⇒ C∆α (by
point 6 of Lemma 10). Because WSCα∆ is V∆-definable, we have, by point 4 of Lemma 10,
(F , s) |=WSCα∆ ⇒ C∆WSCα∆. Hence, (F , s) |=WSCα∆ ⇒ C∆α.
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To show the other direction (F , s) |= C∆α⇒WSCα∆, we consider the formula ψ1 in the
proof of Theorem 25, i.e., the greatest fixed point of the operator
Λ(Z) = α ∧
∧
i∈∆
∀(V −Oi)(θ ⇒ Z).
Because we already have (F , s) |= ψ1 ⇒WSCα∆ by Theorem 25, it suffices to show (F , s) |=
C∆α ⇒ ψ1. Because the greatest fixed point ψ1 of the operator Λ can be obtained by a
finite iteration of the operator with the starting point Λ(true), we only need to prove that
1. F |= C∆α⇒ Λ(true); and
2. for an arbitrary propositional formula ϕ over V , if F |= C∆α⇒ ϕ, then F |= C∆α⇒
Λ(ϕ).
The first point is trivially true because Λ(true) is equivalent to α. To prove the second,
suppose F |= C∆α ⇒ ϕ. Then, for each i ∈ ∆, F |= Ki(C∆α ⇒ ϕ). Thus, we have that
F |= C∆α⇒ Kiϕ by points 5 and 7 of Lemma 10. Hence, F |= C∆α⇒ ∀(V −Oi)(θ ⇒ ϕ)
(by Corollary 14). It follows that F |= C∆α ⇒ ∧i∈∆ ∀(V − Oi)(θ ⇒ ϕ) and hence F |=
C∆α⇒ Λ(ϕ). We thus get F |= C∆α⇒ ψ1. This completes the proof. 2
Proposition 27 Given V , F , ∆, V∆, α as defined in Theorem 26. Let ψ be a formula
over V . Assume that a strongest V∆-necessary condition of ψ is SNCψ∆. Denote by Sψ the
set of those states s of F such that (F , s) |= ψ, and by S
SNCψ∆
the set of those states s such
that (F , s) |= SNCψ∆. Then, we have
(F , Sψ) |= C∆α iff (F , SSNCψ∆) |= α.
Proof: Let S1 be the set of all states s such that there is a state s′ with s′ |= ψ and
(s′, s) ∈ V∆. We have that (F , Sψ) |= C∆α iff for every s ∈ S1, (F , s) |= α. This leads
to (F , Sψ) |= C∆α iff (F , S1) |= α. On the other hand, by Proposition 24, we have that
S1 = SSNCψ∆
. Then the conclusion of the proposition follows immediately. 2
Note that, in Proposition 27, if α is a propositional formula, we have that (F , Sψ) |= C∆α
iff Γ |= SNCψ∆ ⇒ α. Moreover, by Theorem 26, we have (F , Sψ) |= C∆α iff Γ |= ψ ⇒
WSCα∆, where WSC
α
∆ is a weakest V∆-sufficient of α.
5. Adding Public Announcement Operator
There is a recent trend of extending epistemic logic with dynamic operators so that the evo-
lution of knowledge can be expressed. The most basic such extension is public announcement
logic (PAL), which is obtained by adding an operator for truthful public announcements.
The original version of PAL was proposed by Plaza (1989). In this section, we show that
public announcement operator can be conveniently dealt with via our notion of knowledge
structure.
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5.1 Public Announcement Logic
Given a set of agents A = {1, . . . , n} and a set V of propositional variables. The language
of public announcement logic (PALn) is inductively defined as
ϕ ::= p|¬ϕ|ϕ ∧ ψ|Kiϕ|C∆ϕ|[ϕ]ψ
where p ∈ V , i ∈ A and ∆ ⊆ A.
In other words, PALn is obtained from epistemic logic LCn (V ) by adding public an-
nouncement operator [ϕ] for each formula ϕ. Formula [ϕ]ψ means that “after public an-
nouncement of ϕ, formula ψ is true.”
We now give the semantics of public announcement logic under Kripke model. Given a
Kripke structure M = (W,pi,K1, . . . ,Kn), the semantics of the new operators is defined as
follows.
M,w |= [ϕ]ψ iff M,w |= ϕ implies M |ϕ, w |= ψ, where M |ϕ is a Kripke structure such
that M |ϕ = (W ′, pi′,K′1, . . . ,K′n) and
• W ′ = {w ∈W |M,w |= ϕ},
• pi′(w′)(p) = pi(w′)(p) for each w′ ∈W ′ and each p ∈ V , and
• K′i = Ki ∩ (W ′ ×W ′) for each i ∈ A.
There are some sentences that become false immediately after the announcement of
them. Consider, for example, the sentence ‘p is true but was not commonly known to be
true ’. By the announcement of the sentence all agents learn that p and therefore p is
commonly known. This can be modelled in public announcement logic by valid formula
[ϕ]¬ϕ, where ϕ = p ∧ ¬C∆p. To see its validity, let (M,w) be an arbitrary situation. If
M,w |= ϕ,then M,w |= p, which implies that M |ϕ, w |= C∆p, and therefore M |ϕ, w |= ¬ϕ.
5.2 Semantics under Knowledge Structure
The semantics of public announcement logic can be conveniently characterized by our notion
of knowledge structure. We define the satisfaction relationship |= between a scenario (F , s)
and a formula in PALn. We need only consider those formulas of the form [ϕ]ψ; other cases
are the same as in Definition 9.
Let V be a finite set of propositional variables and F = (Γ, V,O1, · · · , On). The semantics
definition for the new operators is as follows. First, let F|ϕ be the knowledge structure
({θ}, V,O1, · · · , On), where θ is a propositional formula on V such that (F , s) |= ϕ iff s
satisfies θ. As V is a finite set, such a propositional formula θ always exists.
Then, we set that (F , s) |= [ϕ]ψ iff (F , s) |= ϕ implies that (F|ϕ, s) |= ψ.
We remark that if formula ϕ is equivalent to propositional one ϕ′ in knowledge structure
F , i.e., F |= ϕ ⇔ ϕ′ for some propositional formula ϕ′, then we can simply define F|ϕ as
(Γ ∪ {ϕ′}, V,O1, · · · , On).
The following proposition indicates that the semantics of public announcement logic
under knowledge structure coincides with that under Kripke model.
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Proposition 28 (1) Let V be a finite set of propositional variables and F = (Γ, V,O1, · · · , On).
For every state s of F and every formula α ∈ PALn, we have that (F , s) |= α iff the sit-
uation (M(F), s) |= α. (2) For a finite S5n Kripke structure M and possible world w in
M , there is a knowledge structure FM and a state sw of F such that, for every formula
α ∈ PALn, we have that (FM , sw) |= α iff (M,w) |= α.
Proof: (1) Let us proceed by induction on the structure of formula α. We consider only
the case that α is of the form [ϕ]ψ; other cases are straightforward by the definitions.
By the definition, we have that (F , s) |= [ϕ]ψ iff (F , s) |= ϕ implies that (F|ϕ, s) |= ψ.
Thus, by the inductive assumption, we have that (F , s) |= [ϕ]ψ iff (M(F), s) |= ϕ implies
that (M(F|ϕ), s) |= ψ. We want to show that (F , s) |= [ϕ]ψ iff (M(F), s) |= [ϕ]ψ. It suffices
to show that M(F|ϕ) equals M(F)|ϕ because (M(F), s) |= [ϕ]ψ iff (M(F), s) |= ϕ implies
that (M(F)|ϕ, s) |= ψ.
First, the set of possible states of M(F|ϕ) equals to the set of those states s′ of F with
(F , s′) |= ϕ. By the inductive assumption, (F , s′) |= ϕ iff (M(F), s′) |= ϕ. Thus, the set
of possible states of M(F|ϕ) equals to the set of those states s′ of F with (M(F), s′) |= ϕ,
hence equals to the set of possible states of M(F)|ϕ. Second, we have that for each s′ of F
with (M(F), s′) |= ϕ, piM(F|ϕ)(s′) = s′ and piM(F)|ϕ(s′) = piM(F)(s′) = s′. Hence piM(F|ϕ) =
piM(F)|ϕ . Finally, for all states s1 and s2 of F with (M(F), s1) |= ϕ and (M(F), s2) |= ϕ,
we have that (s1, s2) ∈ KM(F|ϕ)i iff (s1, s2) ∈ KM(F)i iff s1 ∩ Oi = s2 ∩ Oi. Moreover,
(s1, s2) ∈ KM(F)|ϕi iff s1 ∩Oi = s2 ∩Oi. Therefore, KM(F|ϕ)i = KM(F)|ϕi . This completes the
proof for M(F|ϕ) =M(F)|ϕ.
(2) Suppose M = (W0, pi0, R1, · · · , Rn), where W0 is a finite set and R1, · · · , Rn are
equivalence relations. We assume also that the set of propositional variables is V0.
Let O1, · · · , On be sets of new propositional variables such that
1. O1, · · · , On are finite and pairwise disjoint; and
2. for each i (0 < i ≤ n), the number of all subsets of Oi is not less than that of all
equivalence classes of Ri.
By the latter condition, there is, for each i, a function gi: W0 7→ 2Oi such that for all
w1, w2 ∈ W0, gi(w1) and gi(w2) are the same subset of Oi iff w1 and w2 are in the same
equivalence class of Ri.
Let V = V0∪⋃0<i≤nOi. We define a function g :W0 7→ 2V as follows. For each possible
world w in W0,
g(w) = {v ∈ V | pi(w)(v) = true} ∪
⋃
0<i≤n
gi(w).
The following two claims hold:
C1 For all w1, w2 ∈ W0, and i (0 < i ≤ n), we have that g(w1) ∩ Oi = g(w2) ∩ Oi iff
w1Riw2.
C2 For all w ∈W0 and v ∈ V0, we have that v ∈ g(w) iff pi(w)(v) = true.
For any W ⊂W0, let
ΓW = {α | α is over V, and g(w) |= α for all w ∈W}.
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We then get a knowledge structure
FW = (V,ΓW , O1, · · · , On).
We now show that following claim:
C3 For every s ⊆ V , s is a state of FW iff s = g(w) for some w ∈W.
The “if” part of claim C3 is easy to prove. If s = g(w′) for some w′ ∈ W , then by the
definition of ΓW , we have that g(w′) |= ΓW and hence g(w′) is a state of FM . To show the
“only if” part, assume that for every w ∈W , s 6= g(w). Then, for every w ∈W , there exists
αw over V such that s |= αw but g(w) |= ¬αw. Therefore, s |= ∧w∈W αw. Moreover, we have
that, for every w′ ∈ W , g(w′) |= ∨w∈W ¬αw, and hence ∨w∈W ¬αw ∈ ΓW . Consequently,
we have that s 6|= ΓW and hence s is not a state of FW .
To complete the proof of the second part, it suffices to show, for every α ∈ PALn, that
(FW , g(w)) |= α iff (M |W , w) |= α, where M |W is a Kripke structure such that M |ϕ =
(W,pi,R′1, . . . , R′n) and
• pi(w)(p) = pi0(w)(p) for each w ∈W and each p ∈ V0, and
• R′i = Ri ∩ (W ′ ×W ′) for each i with 0 < i ≤ n.
With claims C1, C2 and C3, we can do so by induction on α. Again, we consider only
the case that α is of the form [ϕ]ψ; other cases can be dealt with in the same way as the
proof of Proposition 12.
We first show that knowledge structure FW |ϕ is equivalent to FW ′ , where
W ′ = {w′ ∈W |MW , w |= ϕ}.
As the two knowledge structures have the same set V of propositional variables and, for
each agent i, the same set Oi of observable variables to agent i, we need only to prove that
they have the same set of states. An assignment s on V is a state of FW |ϕ iff s is a state of
FW and FW , s |= ϕ. Thus, by claim C3, s is a state of FW |ϕ iff s = g(w′) for some w′ ∈W
with FW , g(w′) |= ϕ. On the other hand, we have, by claim C3 again, that assignment s is
a state of FW ′ iff s = g(w′) for some w′ ∈ W ′, i.e., w′ ∈ W and MW , w′ |= ϕ. However, by
the induction assumption, FW , g(w′) |= ϕ iff MW , w′ |= ϕ. Therefore, knowledge structures
FW |ϕ and FW ′ have the same set of states.
To show (FW , g(w)) |= [ϕ]ψ iff (M |W , w) |= [ϕ]ψ, we have, by the induction as-
sumption, that (FW , g(w)) |= ϕ iff (M |W , w) |= ϕ. Also, by the claim we just proved
above, we have that (FW |ϕ, g(w)) |= ψ iff (FW ′ , g(w)) |= ψ. By the induction assump-
tion again, (FW ′ , g(w)) |= ψ iff MW ′ , w |= ψ. By the definition of W ′, we have that
MW |ϕ, w |= ψ. Hence, (FW |ϕ, g(w)) |= ψ iff MW |ϕ, w |= ψ. Therefore, by the semantics
of the announcement operators in Kripke structure and knowledge structure, we have that
(FW , g(w)) |= [ϕ]ψ iff (M |W , w) |= [ϕ]ψ. 2
The above proposition is a generalization of Propositions 11 and 12 to PALn, which
shows that the satisfiability issue for a formula in the language of multi-agent S5 with
the announcement operators is the same whatever satisfiability is meant w.r.t. a standard
Kripke structure or w.r.t. a knowledge structure.
Notice that, for every formula in PALn, we can get an equivalent propositional formula.
More specifically, we have the following:
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Remark 29 Let V be a finite set of propositional variables and F = ({θ}, V,O1, · · · , On).
Given a formula α ∈ PALn, we define a propositional formula bαeθ by induction on the
structure of α:
• If α is a propositional formula, then bαeθ = α.
• bα ∧ βeθ = bαeθ ∧ bβeθ.
• bKiαeθ = ∀(V −Oi)(θ ⇒ bαeθ).
• Let ∆ ⊆ {1, · · · , n}, V∆ = {Oi | i ∈ ∆}. Then
bC∆αeθ =WSCbαe
θ
∆
where WSCbαe
θ
∆ is a weakest V∆-sufficient condition bαeθ under θ.
• b[ϕ]αeθ = bαeθ∧bϕeθ
Then, for every α ∈ PALn, we have that F |= α⇔ bαeθ.
6. Complexity Results
We are interested in the following problem: given a knowledge structure F and a formula α
in the language of epistemic logic, whether formula α is realized in structure F . This kind of
problem is called the realization problem. In this section, we examine the inherent difficulty
of the realization problem in terms of computational complexity. In the general case, this
problem is PSPACE-Complete; however, for some interesting subset of the language, it can
be reduced to co-NP.
Let L be some epistemic logic (or language). The realization problem for L is, given a
knowledge structure F and a formula α ∈ L, to determine whether F |= α holds.
The realization problem here is closely related to the model checking problem: given an
epistemic formula α and a Kripke structure M , to determine whether M |= α. By checking
the definition of Kripke structure semantics for epistemic logic, we can see that the model
checking problem can be solved in polynomial time (with respect to the input size (| M |
+ | α |). We can determine whether a formula α is realized in a knowledge structure F by
first translating knowledge structure F into a Kripke structure M then checking M |= α.
However, the resulting algorithm will be exponential in space. This is because the size of
the corresponding Kripke structure M is exponential with respect to knowledge structure
F .
A number of algorithms for model checking epistemic specifications and the compu-
tational complexity of the related realization problems were studied in (van der Meyden,
1998). However, like Kripke structure, the semantics framework they adopt is to list all
global states explicitly. As a result, the size of the input of the concerned decision problem
can be very large.
Proposition 30 The realization problem for Ln is PSPACE-complete.
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Proof: The proposition is of two parts: the PSPACE-easiness and the PSPACE-hardness.
The PSPACE-easiness part means that there is an algorithm that determines in polynomial
space whether an epistemic formula α ∈ Ln is realized in a knowledge structure F . The
PSPACE-completeness indicates that there is a PSPACE-hard problem, say the satisfiability
problem for quantified propositional formulas (QBF) (Stockmeyer & Meyer, 1973), can be
effectively reduced to the realization problem we consider.
It is not difficult to see the PSPACE-easiness. Given a knowledge structure and epistemic
formula α, by Corollary 14, we can replace knowledge modalities by propositional quantifiers
in formula α. So, the problem of whether α is realized in F is reduced to determine
whether a quantified Boolean formulas is valid. The latter can be done in polynomial space
(Stockmeyer & Meyer, 1973).
As for the PSPACE-hardness, it suffices to show that for every QBF formula
∀p1∃q2∀p2∃q3 · · · ∀pm−1∃qmA(p1, q2, p2, q3 · · · , pm−1, qm),
we can construct a knowledge structure F such that
` ∀p1∃q2∀p2∃q3 · · · ∀pm−1∃qmA(p1, q2, p2 · · · , pm−1, qm)
iff
F |= d1 ∧ ¬d2 ⇒ (K1¬K2¬)m−1(dm ∧A(p1, q2, p2, q3 · · · , pm−1, qm)).
Let F = (V, {θ}, O1, O2), where
1. V = {c} ∪ {d1, · · · , dm} ∪ {d′1, · · · , d′m} ∪ {p1, · · · , pm} ∪ {q1, · · · , qm}
2. θ is the conjunction of the following formulas
(a) ∧
j<m
(dj+1 ⇒ dj) ∧ (d′j+1 ⇒ d′j)
(b) ∧
j<m
dj ∧ ¬dj+1 ⇒ ∧
i6=j
(pi ⇔ qi)

(c)
c⇒
∧
j<m+1
(dj ⇔ d′j)
(d)
¬c⇒
((dm−1 ∧ ¬dm)⇔ d′m) ∧ ∧
j<m−1
(
(dj ∧ ¬dj+1)⇔ (d′j+1 ∧ ¬d′j+2)
)
3. O1 = {c} ∪ {d1, · · · , dm} ∪ {q1, · · · , qm}
4. O2 = {d′1, · · · , d′m} ∪ {p1, · · · , pm}
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In our picture, we have only two agents: agents 1 and 2. We assign every state an
integer number, called the depth of the state for convenience. For every j, dj expresses
that the depth of the state is at least j. Propositions d1, · · · , dm are observable to agent
1, but not to agent 2. Nevertheless, agent 2 can observe d′1, · · · , d′m, which are closely
related to d1, · · · , dm. The formula in item 2c indicates that d′1, · · · , d′m are the same as
d1, · · · , dm if c holds, while the formula in item 2d says that, if c does not hold, the depth
expressed by d1, · · · , dm is less than that by d′1, · · · , d′m and the difference is 1. The formula
in item 2b implies that, under the condition that the depth of the state is exactly j, only
pj is unobservable to agent 1 and only qj is unobservable to agent 2.
In order to show that
` ∀p1∃q2∀p2∃q3 · · · ∀pm−1∃qmA(p1, q2, p2 · · · , pm−1, qm)
implies
F |= d1 ∧ ¬d2 ⇒ (K1¬K2¬)m−1(dm ∧A(p1, q2, p2, q3 · · · , pm−1, qm)),
it suffices to prove that, for every j ≤ m and propositional formula ϕ over p1, · · · , pm,
q1, · · · , qm,
F |= dj ∧ ¬dj+1 ∧ ∀pj∃qj+1ϕ⇒ K1¬K2¬(dj+1 ∧ ¬dj+2 ∧ ϕ)
To do so, we need only to show that
F |= dj ∧ ¬dj+1 ∧ ∀pjϕ⇒ K1(dj ∧ ¬dj+1 ∧ ϕ)
and
F |= dj ∧ ¬dj+1 ∧ ∃qj+1ϕ⇒ ¬K2¬(dj+1 ∧ ¬dj+2 ∧ ϕ).
As for the other direction, we notice that, for each l < m− 1,
F |= d1 ∧ ¬d2 ⇒ (K1K2)l¬dl+2.
We also notice that, for each 1 < m′ ≤ m,
F |= K1¬K2dm′ ⇒ dm′−1
and
F |= dm′−1 ∧ ¬dm′ ∧K1¬K2¬(dm′ ∧ ϕ)⇒ ∀pm′−1∃qm′ϕ.
By applying the above three claims repeatedly, we can obtain that
F |= d1 ∧ ¬d2 ∧ (K1¬K2¬)m−1(dm ∧ ϕ)⇒ ∀p1∃q2∀p2∃q3 · · · ∀pm−1∃qmϕ.
Therefore, if
F |= d1 ∧ ¬d2 ⇒ (K1¬K2¬)m−1(dm ∧ ϕ)
then we have that ∀p1∃q2∀p2∃q3 · · · ∀pm−1∃qmϕ is satisfiable in F because so is d1 ∧ ¬d2.
However, as the QBF formula ∀p1∃q2∀p2∃q3 · · · ∀pm−1∃qmϕ does not contain any free vari-
able, we immediately conclude that the QBF formula is valid from that QBF formula is
satisfiable in F . 2
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By Remark 29, we can see that, for the language of formulas in PALn without common
knowledge operators, the realization problem can be reduced to the problem of validness
problem of quantified Boolean formulas, and hence is PSPACE-complete by Proposition 30.
We conjecture that the realization problem is also PSPACE-complete for LCn and PALn.
Proposition 30 indicates that the realization problem in the general case is hard for a
computer to solve. Thus, it is interesting to give some special cases with lower computational
complexity. Let L+Kn be the fragment of positive formulas in Ln. It consists of those formulas
such that the negation can be applied only to propositional formulas and the modalities are
restricted toK1, · · · ,Kn. For instance, formulaK1K2p∨K1K2¬p (where p is a propositional
formula) belongs to L+Kn , but formula K1K2p ∨K1¬K2p does not.
The sublanguage L+Kn is interesting in that it is sufficient to represent most important
security properties for security protocols. Moreover, as shown in the following proposition,
the complexity of the realization problem for L+Kn is co-NP-complete.
Proposition 31 The realization problem for L+Kn is co-NP-complete.
Proof: It is well-known that the validity problem for propositional formulas is co-NP-
complete. We can easily get the co-NP-hardness of the realization problem for L+Kn , because
the validity problem for propositional formulas can be reduced to the realization problem
for propositional formulas (considering the case where background knowledge base is a
tautology).
On the other hand, to show the realization problem for L+Kn is in co-NP, we show it can
be reduced to the validity problem of propositional formulas. Given a knowledge structure
F and formula ϕ in L+Kn , we will translate ϕ into a propositional formula ‖ϕ‖F (which will
be define below), so that ϕ is realized in F iff θ ⇒ ‖ϕ‖F is valid, where θ is the background
knowledge base of knowledge structure F .
Suppose F = (V, {θ}, O1, · · · , On). For every subformula Kiψ of ϕ, we introduce a set
V iψ of new propositional variables such that | V iψ |=| V −Oi |.
The propositional translation ‖ϕ‖F is inductively given as follows.
1. If ϕ is a propositional formula, then ‖ϕ‖F = ϕ.
2. If ϕ is of the conjunction form ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, then
‖ϕ‖F = ‖ϕ1‖F ∧ ‖ϕ2‖F .
3. If ϕ is of the disjunction form ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, then
‖ϕ‖F = ‖ϕ1‖F ∨ ‖ϕ2‖F .
4. If ϕ is of the form Kiψ, then
‖ϕ‖F = (θ ⇒ ‖ψ‖F )(V −Oi
V iψ
),
where (θ ⇒ ‖ψ‖F )(V−OiV i
ψ
) is the formula obtained from (θ ⇒ ‖ψ‖F ) by replacing
variables in V −Oi by the new ones in V iψ.
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The idea behind the above translation is that we first translate formula ϕ into a quantified
propositional formula, where all the quantifiers are universal ones, and then eliminate those
universal quantifiers by introducing new variables.
Let Vϕ be the set of new variables in ‖ϕ‖F . To show the correctness of the translation,
it suffices to show that F |= ϕ⇔ ∀Vϕ‖ϕ‖F .
We prove this claim by induction on ϕ.
• It is trivial, if ϕ is a propositional formula.
• If ϕ is of the form ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, the claim can be obtained immediately by the induction
assumption.
• If ϕ is of the form ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, we have that ∀Vϕ(‖ϕ1‖F ∨ ‖ϕ2‖F ) is logically equivalent
to ∀Vϕ1‖ϕ1‖F ∨ ∀Vϕ2‖ϕ2‖F , as the variables in Vϕ1 do not appear in ∀Vϕ2‖ϕ2‖F and
those in Vϕ2 do not in ∀Vϕ1‖ϕ1‖F . Thus, the claim holds by the induction assumption.
• Finally, if ϕ is of the form Kiψ, then
‖ϕ‖F = (θ ⇒ ‖ψ‖F )(V −Oi
V iψ
).
Therefore, Vϕ = Vψ∪V iψ and ∀Vϕ‖ϕ‖F is logically equivalent to (θ ⇒ ∀V iψ∀Vψ‖ψ‖F )(V−OiV i
ψ
).
Thus, by the induction assumption, we have that
F |= ∀Vϕ‖ϕ‖F ⇔ (θ ⇒ ∀V iψψ(
V −Oi
V iψ
)
and hence
F |= ∀Vϕ‖ϕ‖F ⇔ (θ ⇒ ∀(V −Oi)ψ).
Therefore, we have F |= ∀Vϕ‖ϕ‖F ⇔ Kiψ. 2
Proposition 31 implies that, for an arbitrary formula ϕ in L+Kn and a knowledge structure
F with background knowledge base θ,
F |= ϕ iff θ ∧ ¬‖ϕ‖F is unsatisfiable.
Thus, we can solve the realization problem for formulas in L+Kn by using a propositional
satisfiability solver.
7. A Case Study: the Muddy Children Puzzle
In this section, we demonstrate how our framework can be applied to practical problems by
using the example of the muddy children puzzle.
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7.1 Muddy Children Puzzle
The muddy children puzzle is a well-known variant of the wise men puzzle. The story goes
as follows (Fagin et al., 1995): Imagine n children playing together. Some of the children,
say k of them, get mud on their foreheads. Each can see the mud on others but not on
his/her own forehead. Along comes the father, who says, “at least one of you has mud on
your forehead.” The father then asks the following question, over and over: “Does any of
you know whether you have mud on your own forehead?”
Assuming that all children are perceptive, intelligent, truthful, and they answer simul-
taneously, what we want to show is that the first (k− 1) times the father asks the question,
they will say “No” but the kth time the children with muddy foreheads will all answer “Yes.”
7.2 Modeling the Muddy Children Puzzle
To model the muddy children puzzle, let mi be a propositional variable, which means that
child i is muddy (i < n). Denote by V the set {mi | i < n}. Suppose the assignment
s0 = {mi | i < k} represents the actual state: child 0, · · ·, child k − 1 have mud on their
foreheads; and the other children have not. This can be captured by the scenario (F0, s0),
where F0 = (V,Γ0, O0, · · · , On−1) with
• V = {mi | i < n};
• Γ0 = ∅;
• and Oi = V − {mi} for each i < n.
Let ϕ =
∧
i<n ¬Kimi, which indicates that every child does not know whether he has
mud on his own forehead. For convenience, we introduce, for all natural number l, the
notations [ϕ]lψ so that [ϕ]0ψ = ψ and [ϕ]l+1ψ = [ϕ][ϕ]lψ. The properties we want to show
is then formally expressed in PALn:
• [∨i<nmi][ϕ]jϕ for every 0 ≤ j < k − 1, and
• [∨i<nmi][ϕ]k−1∧i<kKimi.
Formula [
∨
i<nmi][ϕ]
jϕ means that the children will all say “No” for the j + 1th time the
father asks the question. In particular, when j = 0, the condition 0 ≤ j < k−1 is simplified
as k > 1; and the resulting formula [
∨
i<nmi]ϕ says that after the father announces
∨
i<nmi
every child says “No”. Formula [
∨
i<nmi][ϕ]
k−1∧
i<kKimi indicates that the k
th time the
children with muddy foreheads will all answer “Yes.”
Therefore, what we want to prove is that
(F0, s0) |=
 ∧
0≤j<k−1
[
∨
i<n
mi][ϕ]jϕ
 ∧
[∨
i<n
mi][ϕ]k−1
∧
i<k
Kimi
 .
To check the above, we basically follow the definition of PAL semantics under knowledge
structure. During the checking process, a series Fj (0 < j ≤ k) of knowledge structures are
constructed so that F1 = F0 |∨
i<n
mi
and, for every j (0 < j < k), Fj+1 = Fj |ϕ.
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Figure 1: Performances of the two algorithms for the muddy children puzzle
Specifically, we have that, for each step j ≤ k, we get
Fj = (V,Γj , O0, · · · , On−1)
where Oi = V − {mi} for each i < n, and Γj is defined as follows:
• At step 1: Γ1 = {∨i<nmi}.
• At step j + 1: Let ϕb = ∧i<n ¬∀mi(Γj ⇒ mi). As for each i < n, Fj |= Kimi ⇔
∀mi(Γj ⇒ mi), we have that Fj |= ϕ⇔ ϕb. Thus, we may set Γj+1 = Γj ∪
{
ϕb
}
.
Therefore, it suffices to verify, for 0 < j < k and i < n, (Fj , s0) |= ¬Kimi, and for i < k,
(Fk, s0) |= Kimi.
7.3 Experimental Results
Our framework of knowledge structure has been implemented by using the BDD library
(CUDD) developed by Fabio Somenzi at Colorado University. Notice that BDD-based
QBF solvers for satisfiability problems are not among the best solvers nowadays. However,
in the experiments here we need to compute and represent a serial of Boolean functions
(say Γj), which are not decision problems and can not be solved by a general QBF solver.
To check agents’ knowledge, we implemented two different algorithms in terms of Part
1 and 2 of Corollary 19 in Section 3, respectively. Algorithm 1, which is based on part
1 of Corollary 19, seems much more efficient than Algorithm 2, which is based on part 2
of Corollary 19, for this particular example. The reason is as follows. It is clear that the
main task of both algorithms is to check whether (Fj , s0) |= Kimi. However, Algorithm 1’s
method is to compute s0 |= ∀mi(Γj ⇒ mi), while Algorithm 2 is to compute |= ∃mi(Γj ∧
s0)⇒ mi. Now the main reason why Algorithm 1 is much more efficient for this particular
problem is clear: ∀mi(Γj ⇒ mi) is simply equivalent to ¬Γj( mifalse). Assuming half of the
children are muddy, Fig. 1 gives the performances for a Pentium IV PC at 2.4GHz, with
512RAM. In the figure, the x-axis is for the number of children, and the y-axis for the CPU
run time in seconds.
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The muddy children puzzle as a famous benchmark problem of reasoning about knowl-
edge can be resolved by both proof-theoretic and semantical approaches (Baltag et al., 1998;
Gerbrandy, 1999; Lomuscio, 1999). Proof-theoretic approaches depend on efficient provers
for multi-modal logics; and semantical ones may suffer from the state-explosion problem.
Our approach is essentially a semantic one, but we give a syntactical and compact way
to represent Kripke structures by using knowledge structures, and hence may avoid the
state-explosion problem to some extent.
8. Application to Verification of Security Protocols
In this section, we apply our knowledge model to security protocol verification. Security
protocols that set up credits of the parties and deal with the distribution of cryptographic
keys are essential in communication over vulnerable networks. Authentication plays a key
role in security protocols. Subtle bugs that lead to attack are often found when the protocols
have been used for many years. This presents a challenge of how to prove the correctness
of a security protocol. Formal methods are introduced to establish and prove whether a
secure protocol satisfies a certain authentication specification.
8.1 Background on Authentication Protocols
Authentication protocols aim to coordinate the activity of different parties (usually referred
to as principals) over a network. They generally consist of a sequence of message exchanges
whose format is fixed in advance and must be conformed to. Usually, a principal can take
part into a protocol run in different ways, as the initiator or the responder ; we often call
the principal has different roles. Very often a principal can take part into several protocol
runs simultaneously with different roles.
The designers of authentication protocols must have the conscious in mind that the
message may be intercepted and someone with malicious intention can impersonate an
honest principal. One of the key issues in authentication is to ensure the confidentiality, that
is, to prevent private information from being disclosed to unauthorized entities. Another
issue is to avoid intruder impersonating other principals. In general, a principal should
ensure that the message he receives was created recently and sent by the principal who
claims to have sent it.
Cryptography is a fundamental element in authentication. A message transmitted over
a channel without any cryptographic converting is called plaintext. The intention of cryp-
tography is to transform a given message to some form that is unrecognizable by anyone
except the intended receiver. The procedure is called encryption and the corresponding
parameter is known as encryption key. The encoded message is referred to as ciphertext.
The reverse procedure is called decryption and uses the corresponding decryption key. The
symmetric-key cryptography, which is also called secret-key cryptography, uses the same key
for both encryption and decryption. The asymmetric-key cryptography, which is also called
public-key cryptography, uses different keys for encryption and decryption. The one for the
encryption is the public key that is generally available for anyone. Corresponding to the
public key is the private key, which is for the decryption and only owned by one principal.
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8.2 The Dolev-Yao Intruder Model
The standard adversary model for the analysis of security protocols was introduced by
Dolev and Yao in 1983 and is commonly known as Dolev-Yao model (Dolev & Yao, 1983).
According to this model, a set of conservative assumptions are made as follows:
1. Messages are considered as indivisible abstract values instead of sequences of bits.
2. All the messages from one principal to any other principals must pass through the
adversary and the adversary acts as a general router in the communication.
3. The adversary can read, alter and redirect any message.
4. The adversary can only decrypt a message if he has the right keys, and can only
compose new messages from keys and messages that he already possesses.
5. The adversary can not perform any statistical or other cryptanalytic attacks.
Although this model has the drawback of finding implementation dependent attacks, it
simplifies the protocol analysis. It has been proved to be the most powerful modeling of
the adversary (Cervesato, 2001) because it can simulate any other possible attackers.
8.3 The Revised Needham-Schroeder Protocol
As Lowe (1996) pointed out, the Needham-Schroeder protocol has the problem of lacking
the identity of the responder and can be fixed by a small modification. However, it is not
clear if the revised version is correct. Our approach provides a method to automatically
prove the correctness of security protocols instead of just finding bugs as usual analysis
tools do for security protocols.
In the cryptography literature, the revised Needham-Schroeder protocol is described as
follows:
1. A→ B: {Na,A}Kb
2. B → A: {B,Na,Nb}Ka
3. A→ B: {Nb}Kb
where A→ B :M is a notation for “A sends B the messageM ” or “B receives the message
M from A”. The notation {M}K means the encryption of M with the key K. Also, A,B
denote the principal identifiers; and Ka,Kb indicate, respectively, A’s and B’s public keys.
Moreover, Na and Nb are the nonces which are newly generated unguessable values by A
and B, respectively, to guarantee the freshness of messages.
Two informal goals or specifications of the protocol are “A knows that B knows A said
Na and Na is fresh,” and “B knows that A knows B said Nb and Nb is fresh .”
To analyze the protocol, we introduce A and B local histories for the protocol: If A
plays the role of the initiator in the protocol, and assumes that B be the responsor, then
A’s local history is that
1. A said {Na,A}KbA
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2. A sees {BA, Na,NbA}Ka
3. A said {NbA}KbA
where “A said M” means that A sent the message M , or other message containing M ;
“A sees M” indicates that A receives M or got M by some received messages; BA is the
responsor of the protocol from A’s local view; KbA and NbA are, from A’s local view, the
responsor’s public key and nonce, respectively.
If B plays the role of the responsor in the protocol, and assumes A be the initiator, then
A’s local history is that
1. B sees {NaB, AB}Kb
2. B said {B,NaB, Nb}Ka
3. B sees {Nb}Kb
where AB is the initiator of the protocol from B’s local observations; KaB and NaB are,
from B’s local view, the initiator’s public key and nonce, respectively.
The main point of our analysis is that if an agent is involved in the protocol, then the
agent’s real observations should be compatible with the so-called local history. For example,
if A is the initiator of the protocol, and A sees {B,NaB, Nb}Ka, then according to A’s local
history for the protocol we have that A assumes that B is the responsor of the protocol,
the responsor’s nonce is Nb, and from the responsor’s view, the initiator’s nonce is Na (see
the 4th formula of the background knowledge Γ below).
Let us see how our framework of reasoning about knowledge can be applied to this
protocol.
The variable set VRNS consists of the following atoms:
• fresh(Na): Nonce Na is fresh.
• fresh(Nb): Nonce Nb is fresh.
• role(Init, A): A plays the role of the initiator of the protocol.
• role(Resp,B): B plays the role of the responder of the protocol.
• RespA = B: A assumes that the responder of the protocol is B.
• InitB = A: B assumes that the initiator of the protocol is A.
• NaB = Na: B assumes that the partner’s nonce in the execution of the protocol is
Na.
• NbA = Nb: A assumes that the partner’s nonce in the execution of the protocol is
Nb.
• said(B,Na): B said Na by sending a message containing Na.
• said(A,Nb): A said Nb.
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• sees(B, {Na,A}Kb): B sees {Na,A}Kb (possibly by decrypting the messages re-
ceived.)
• sees(A, {B,NaB, Nb}Ka): A sees {B,NaB, Nb}Ka.
The background knowledge ΓRNS consists of the following formulas:
1.
 sees(B, {Na,A}Kb)∧said(B,Na)∧
fresh(Na)
⇒ role(Resp,B)
2.
 sees(A, {B,NaB, Nb}Ka)∧said(A,Nb)∧
fresh(Nb)
⇒ role(Init, A)
3.

role(Resp,B)∧
sees(B, {Na,A}Kb)∧
said(B,Na)∧
fresh(Na)
⇒
(
InitB = A∧
NaB = Na
)
4.

role(Init, A)∧
sees(A, {B,NaB , Nb}Ka)∧
said(A,Nb)∧
fresh(Nb)
⇒
 RespA = B∧NaB = Na∧
NbA = Nb

5.
(
role(Init, A)∧
RespA = B
)
⇒
(
sees(B, {Na,A}Kb)∧
said(B,Na)
)
6.
(
role(Resp,B)∧
InitB = A
)
⇒
(
sees(A, {B,NaB , Nb}Ka)∧
said(A,Nb)
)
7.
(role(Init, A)⇒ fresh(Na))∧
(role(Resp,B)⇒ fresh(Nb))
Notice that the first two formulas are required for the rationality of the agents A and B.
The other formulas in Γ can be obtained automatically by some fixed set of meta rules. We
obtain the third and fourth formulas by comparing their local history for the protocols to
the conditions appearing in the formulas. To get the fifth formula informally, consider A’s
local history under the conditions role(Init, A) and RespA = B, which should be that
1. A said {Na,A}Kb
2. A sees {B,Na,NbA}Ka
3. A said {NbA}Kb.
According to A’s local history, A sees the nonce Na generated by A itself. Because Na is
only said in the message {Na,A}Kb, thus B, who has the inverse key of Kb, must see this
message and said Na. Similarly, we can see that the sixth formula holds. The last formula
follows immediately by the definition of the protocol.
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The set OA of the observable variables to A is
{fresh(Na), role(Init, A), RespA = B}.
The set OB of the observable variables to B is
{fresh(Nb), role(Resp,B), InitB = A}.
Now consider the knowledge structure
F = (VRNS ,ΓRNS , OA, OB).
Let SpecA be the formal specification: fresh(Na)∧role(Init, A)∧
RespA = B
⇒ KAKB
(
said(A,Na)∧
fresh(Na)
)
and SpecB be the formal specification: fresh(Nb)∧role(Resp,B)∧
InitB = A
⇒ KBKA
(
said(B,Nb)∧
fresh(Nb)
)
.
It is easy to show that, for all states s of F ,
(F , s) |= SpecA ∧ SpecB
as desired.
We should mention that, in the original Needham-Schroeder protocol (Needham &
Schroeder, 1978), the second message isB → A: {Na,Nb}Ka instead ofB → A: {B,Na,Nb}Ka.
Therefore, the fourth formula in Γ would be changed to
role(Init, A)∧
sees(A, {NaB , Nb}Ka)∧
said(A,Nb)∧
fresh(Nb)
⇒ ( NaB = Na∧NbA = Nb
)
Thus, RespA = B does not necessarily hold under the condition
role(Init, A) ∧ sees(A, {NaB, Nb}Ka) ∧ said(A,Nb) ∧ fresh(Nb).
This is why the specifications SpecA and SpecB do not hold for the original Needham-
Schroeder protocol.
8.4 Discussion
BAN logic (Burrows, Abadi, & Needham, 1990) is one of the most successful logical tools
to reason about security protocols. However, the semantics of BAN is always arguable, and
it is not clear under what assumption the rules of BAN logic is sound and complete. This
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motivated the research of seeking more adequate frameworks (models). Providing a model-
theoretic semantics for BAN logic has been a central idea in the development of BAN-like
logics such as AT (Abadi & Tuttle, 1991) and SVO (Syversion & van Oorschot, 1996). The
advantage of our approach is that we use knowledge structures as semantic models to verify
the correctness of epistemic goals for security protocols.
An important problem is that, given a security protocol, where and how the correspond-
ing knowledge structure comes from. To get the knowledge structure corresponding to a
security protocol, we have developed a semantic model, and the background knowledge base
of the corresponding knowledge structure consists of those formulas valid in the semantic
model. Moreover, we can generate the background knowledge systematically. The ongoing
work is to implement our approach into a promising automatic security protocol verifier.
9. Related Work
There are a number of approaches dealing with the concept of variable forgetting or elimi-
nations of middle terms (Boole, 1854) in several contexts. The notion of variable forgetting
was formally defined in propositional and first order logics by Lin and Reiter (1994). In
recent years, theories of forgetting under answer set programming semantics were proposed
(Zhang & Foo, 2006; Eiter & Wang, 2008). Forgetting was also generalized to description
logics (Kontchakov, Wolter, & Zakharyaschev, 2008; Wang, Wang, Topor, & Pan, 2008;
Kontchakov, Walther, & Wolter, 2009).
In the context of epistemic logic, the notion of forgetting was studied in a number of
ways. Baral and Zhang (2006) treated knowledge forgetting as a special form of update
with the effect ¬Kϕ ∧ ¬K¬ϕ: after knowledge forgetting ϕ, the agent would neither know
ϕ nor ¬ϕ. Ditmarsch, Herzig, Lang and Marquis (2008) proposed a dynamic epistemic
logic with an epistemic operator K and a dynamic modal operator [Fg(p)] so that formula
[Fg(p)]ϕ means that after the agent forgets his knowledge about p, ϕ is true. (Zhang &
Zhou, 2008) modeled forgetting via bisimulation invariance except for the forgotten variable.
This notion of variable forgetting is closely related to quantified modal logics, where the
existential variable quantification can be modeled via bisimulation invariance except for the
quantified variable (Engelhardt et al., 2003).
The notion of variable forgetting has various applications in knowledge representation
and reasoning. For example, Weber (1986) applied it to updating propositional knowledge
bases. Lang and Marquis (2002) used it for merging a set of knowledge bases when simply
taking their union may result in inconsistency. The notion of variable forgetting is also
closely related to that of formula-variable independence, because the result of forgetting the
set of variables V in a formula ϕ can be defined as the strongest consequence of ϕ being
independent from V (Lang et al., 2003). More recently, Liu and Lakemeyer (2009) applied
the notion of forgetting into the situation calculus, and obtained some interesting results
about the first-order definability and computability of progression for local-effect actions.
10. Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is as follows. First, we have investigated knowledge
reasoning within a simple framework called knowledge structure, which consists of a global
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knowledge base and a set of observable variables for each agent. The notion of knowledge
structure can be used as a semantic model for a multi-agent logic of knowledge and common
knowledge. In this model, the computation of knowledge and common knowledge can be
reduced to the operation of variable forgetting; moreover, an objective formula α is known
by agent i at state s when any of its weakest sufficient condition on Oi holds at state s.
Second, to capture the notion of common knowledge in our framework, we have gener-
alized the notion of weakest sufficient conditions and obtained, for a set V of sets of propo-
sitional variables, the notion of the weakest V-sufficient conditions. Given a set ∆ of agents
and a family V∆ of observable variable sets of these agents, we have shown that an objective
formula α is common knowledge for agents in ∆ iff the weakest {Oi | i ∈ ∆}-sufficient of α
holds. Also, we have shown that public announcement operator can be conveniently dealt
with via our notion of knowledge structure.
Third, the relationship between S5 Kripke structure and knowledge structure has been
explored. Specifically, the satisfiability issue for a formula in the language of multi-agent
S5 with public announcement operator is the same as what satisfiability is meant w.r.t. a
standard Kripke structure or w.r.t. a knowledge structure.
Fourth, we have examined the computational complexity of the problem whether a
formula α is realized in structure F . In the general case, this problem is PSPACE-hard;
however, there are some interesting subcases in which it can be reduced to co-NP.
Finally, we have shown the strength of the concept of knowledge structure from the prac-
tical side by some empirical results about the satisfiability problem for knowledge structures
based on the instances of the muddy children puzzle, since even for the smallest instances
considered in the experiments generating the corresponding S5 Kripke structure would be
out of reach. we have also discussed the automated analysis and verification of the corrected
Needham-Schroeder protocol via knowledge structures.
Our work presented in this paper can be further extended in several directions. First,
we will investigate whether our knowledge structures can be extended and used as a basis
for knowledge based programming (Fagin et al., 1995). Secondly, in our current framework
of knowledge structures, we have not considered the issue of only knowing which has been
extensively studied in other knowledge reasoning models (Halpern & Lakemeyer, 1996;
van der Hock, Jaspars, & Thijsse, 2003; Levesque, 1990). It will be an interesting topic of
how our knowledge model handles only knowing in reasoning about knowledge. Thirdly,
the notions and methods in this work can be extended to investigate the extension of the
variable forgetting operator to multi-agent logics of beliefs. Finally, recent research has
shown that knowledge update has many important applications in reasoning about actions
and plans and dynamic modeling of multi-agent systems (Zhang, 2003). A first step in
this direction (in mono-agent S5) can be found in the work of Herzig, Lang and Marquis
(2003). Baral and Zhang have proposed a general model for performing knowledge update
based on the standard single agent S5 modal logic (Baral & Zhang, 2001). We believe that
their work can be extended to multi-agent modal logics by using the knowledge structure
defined in this paper and therefore to develop a more general system for knowledge update.
Along this direction, an interesting research issue is to explore the underlying relationship
between knowledge forgetting - a specific type of knowledge update, and variable forgetting
as addressed in this paper.
713
Su, Sattar, Lv, & Zhang
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Ron van der Meyden, Fangzheng Lin and the anonymous reviewers for
their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. This work was partially sup-
ported by the Australian Research Council grant DP0452628, the National Basic Research
973 Program grants (Nos. 2010CB328103, 2009CB320701 and 2005CB321902), and Na-
tional Natural Science Foundation of China grants (Nos. 60725207 and 60763004). This
paper is the revised and extended version of a paper which appeared in Proceedings of KR
2004 (Su, Lv, & Zhang, 2004)
References
Abadi, M., & Tuttle, M. (1991). A semantics for a logic of authentication. In Proceedings
of the Tenth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pp.
201–216.
Baltag, A., Moss, L., & Solecki, S. (1998). The logic of public announcements and common
knowledge for distributed applications (extended abstract). In Proceedings of TARK-
VII, pp. 43–56.
Baral, C., & Zhang, Y. (2001). On the semantics of knowledge update. In Proceedings
of the 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-01), pp.
97–102.
Baral, C., & Zhang, Y. (2006). Knowledge updates: semantic and complexity issues. Arti-
ficial Intelligence, 164, 209–243.
Boole, G. (1854). An Investigation of the Laws of Thought. Walton, London.
Burrows, M., Abadi, M., & Needham, R. M. (1990). A logic of authentication. ACM
Transactions on Computer Systems, 8 (1).
Cervesato, I. (2001). The Dolev-Yao intruder is the most powerful attacker. In Proc. 16th
Annual Int. Symp on Logic in Computer Science.
Dolev, D., & Yao, A. (1983). On the security of public-key protocols. Communications of
the ACM, 29 (8), 198–208.
Eiter, T., & Wang, K. (2008). Semantic forgetting in answer set programming. Artificial
Intelligence, 172, 1644–1672.
Engelhardt, K., van der Meyden, R., & Moses, Y. (1998). Knowledge and the logic of local
propositions. In Proceedings of TARK VII.
Engelhardt, K., van der Meyden, R., & Su, K. (2003). Modal logics with a hierarchy of local
propositional quantifiers. In Advance in Modal Logic, Vol. 4, pp. 9–30. Kings College
Publications.
Fagin, R., Halpern, J., Moses, Y., & Vardi, M. (1995). Reasoning about knowledge. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Gerbrandy, J. (1999). Bisimulation on Plant Kripke. Ph.D thesis, Institute for Logic,
Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam.
714
Variable Forgetting in Reasoning about Knowledge
Halpern, J., & Moses, Y. (1992). A guide to completeness and complexity for modal logics
of knowledge and belief. Artificial Intelligence, 54, 319–379.
Halpern, J., & Zuck, L. (1992). A little knowledge goes a long way: Simple knowledge based
derivations and correctness proofs for a family of protocols. Journal of the ACM,
39 (3), 449–478.
Halpern, J. Y., & Lakemeyer, G. (1996). Multi-agent only knowing. In Proceedings of TARK
VI, pp. 251–265.
Herzig, A., Lang, J., & Marquis, P. (2003). Action representation and partially observable
planning using epistemic logic. In Proceedings of IJCAI-03, pp. 1067–1072.
Hintikka, J. (1962). Knowledge and Belief. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Kontchakov, R., Walther, D., & Wolter, F. (2009). Forgetting and uniform interpolation in
large-scale description logic terminologies. In Proc. of IJCAI’09.
Kontchakov, R., Wolter, F., & Zakharyaschev, M. (2008). Can you tell the difference
between dl-lite ontologies. In Proc. of KR’08.
Kripke, S. (1963). A semantical analysis of modal logic. i: Normal modal propositional
calculi. Z. Math. Logik Grundl. Math., 9, 67–96.
Lang, J., Liberatore, P., & Marquis, P. (2003). Propositional independence: Formula-
variable independence and forgetting. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 18,
391–443.
Lang, J., & Marquis, P. (1998). Complexity results for independence and definability. In
Proc. the 6th International Conference on Knowledge Representation and Reasoning,
pp. 356–367.
Lang, J., & Marquis, P. (2002). Resolving inconsistencies by variable forgetting. In Proc.
of KR’2002, pp. 239–250.
Levesque, H. (1990). All I know: a study in autoepistemic logic. Artificial Intelligence, 42,
263–309.
Lin, F. (2001). On the strongest necessary and weakest sufficient conditions. Artificial
Intelligence, 128, 143–159.
Lin, F., & Reiter, R. (1994). Forget it!. In Greiner, R., & Subramanian, D. (Eds.),Working
Notes of AAAI Fall Symposium on Relevance, pp. 154–159, New Orleans.
Liu, Y., & Lakemeyer, G. (2009). On first-order definability and computability of progression
for local-effect actions and beyond. In Proc. of IJCAI’09.
Lomuscio, A. (1999). Knowledge Sharing among Ideal Agents. Ph.D thesis, School of
Computer Science, University of Birmingham.
Lowe, G. (1996). Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using
FDR. In Margaria, & Steffen (Eds.), Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and
Analysis of Systems, Vol 1055 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 147–166.
Springer Verlag.
Needham, R. M., & Schroeder, M. D. (1978). Using encryption for authentication in large
networks of computers. Communication of the ACM, 21 (12), 993–999.
715
Su, Sattar, Lv, & Zhang
Plaza, J. (1989). Logics of public communications. In Proceedings of the 4th International
Symposium on Methodologies for Intelligent Systems, pp. 201–216–346.
Stockmeyer, L., & Meyer, A. (1973). Word problem requiring exponential time: prelimnary
report. In Proc. 5th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, pp. 1–9.
Su, K., Lv, G., & Zhang, Y. (2004). Reasoing about knowledge by variable forgetting. In
Proceedings of KR-04, pp. 576–586.
Syversion, P. F., & van Oorschot, P. (1996). An unified cryptographic protocol logic. Tech.
rep. NRL Publication 5540-227, Naval Research Lab.
Tarski, A. (1955). A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem ans its applications. Pacific J.
Math., 5, 285–309.
van Benthem, J. (2001). Logics for information update. In Proceedings of TARK-VIII, pp.
51–58.
van der Hock, W., Jaspars, J., & Thijsse, E. (2003). Theories of knowledge and ignorance.
In S. Rahman, J. Symons, D. G., & van Bendegem, J. (Eds.), Logic, Epistemology and
the Unity of Science. Kluwer.
van der Hoek, W., & Wooldridge, M. (2002). Model checking knowledge and time. In Proc.
19th Workshop on SPIN (Model Checking Software), pp. 95–111, Grenoble.
van der Meyden, R. (1998). Common knowledge and update in finite environments. Infor-
mation and Computation, 140 (2), 115–157.
van Ditmarsch, H., Herzig, A., Lang, J., & Marquis, P. (2008). Introspective forgetting. In
Wobcke, W., & Zhang, M. (Eds.), AI 2008: Advances in Artificial Intelligence, Vol.
5360.
van Ditmarsch, H., van der Hoek, W., & Kooi, B. (2005a). Dynamic epistemic logic with
assignment. In Proceedings of AAMAS-05, pp. 141–148.
van Ditmarsch, H., van der Hoek, W., & Kooi, B. (2005b). Public announcements and belief
expansion. In Advances in Modal Logic, Volume 5, pp. 335–346.
Wang, Z., R., Wang, K., Topor, R., & Pan, J. (2008). Forgetting in dl-lite. In Proc. of
ESWC’08.
Weber, A. (1986). Updating propositional formulas. In Proc. First Conference on Expert
Database Systems, pp. 487–500.
Zhang, Y. (2003). Minimal change and maximal coherence for epistemic logic program
updates. In Proceedings of the 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial In-
telligence (IJCAI-03), pp. 112–117.
Zhang, Y., & Foo, N. (2006). Solving logic program conflict through strong and weak
forgettings. Artificial Intelligence, 170, 739–778.
Zhang, Y., & Zhou, Y. (2008). Properties of knowledge forgetting.. In Proceedings of the
20th International Workshop on Non-monoronic Reasoning ( NMR’08), pp. 68–75.
716
